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The governance of sport in deeply divided societies: Actors and institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cyprus and Northern Ireland

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Introduction

Few issues are as central to international politics and diplomacy as conflict and its resolution. Sport, on the other hand, may on first consideration appear to be marginal both to international politics in general and to conflict more specifically. On closer examination, however, the relationship between sport and matters of conflict and peace reveals itself to be a complex and important one – whether in everyday manifestations of violence between sports fans, such as that which marred the early stages of the recent European football championship in France, or symbolised by the lofty goals of the Olympic Movement, which profess to contribute to the building of a more peaceful world. Sport has been implicated in both inter-state and intra-state conflicts, as demonstrated by the examples of the ‘soccer war’ between El Salvador and Honduras in 1969, famously documented by Ryszard Kapuściński, and the riot between Dynamo Zagreb and Red Star Belgrade fans at Zagreb’s Maksimir stadium in May 1990, which has sometimes been seen as the symbolic start of the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia. In the case of intra-state conflicts, violence often leaves sport fractured along national, ethnic, religious or linguistic lines. At the same time, sport is frequently seen as a means of bringing people together and healing rifts in post-conflict

societies, either in a symbolic fashion or in the form of more institutionalised ‘sport for development and peace’ (SDP) projects run by non-governmental organisations with the support of donors and international organisations.

While, as the contributions to this book demonstrate, there is a vibrant literature on sport from a diplomatic history perspective, students of political science and international relations have until recently seemed content to leave the study of sport as a social phenomenon to their colleagues in history and sociology departments. Indeed, it has become something of a cliché to note that sport has been neglected (or indeed actively dismissed) by political scientists.¹ This claim is increasingly difficult to sustain, though, thanks to a now rapidly growing body of work on the politics of sport.² Much of this literature should be of interest to diplomatic historians, and particularly that which examines the role and power of international sports organisations and their interactions with states and other international organisations.³ Another topic that has received significant attention in the past decade or so has been the SDP sector mentioned above – studies of the use of sport to attempt to further development outcomes and promote peace-building in developing and post-conflict states have flourished.⁴

While this focus on SDP initiatives is welcome, particularly given that the declaration of the Sustainable Development Goals adopted in September 2015 proclaims to recognise ‘the growing contribution of sport to the realization of development and peace in its promotion of tolerance and respect’,⁵ the focus of this chapter is on a more mundane issue: that of the *governance* of sport in deeply divided societies.⁶ Unlike the SDP literature, the focus here is not on assessing whether and how sport can serve the purpose of lessening divisions between groups in such societies, but on how, given that such divisions exist, sport is organised and governed – and how a variety of actors have contributed to the shaping of the institutions of governance of sport.

The chapter identifies broad patterns amongst the types of the institutions used to govern sport in three deeply divided societies, namely Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter, Bosnia), Cyprus and Northern Ireland.⁷ The chapter draws on some of the existing research on the governance of sport in each of these cases, but it also seeks to move beyond the analysis of single cases and start to establish more general observations about how sports federations, often under the influence of diplomatic actors such as regional and international governing bodies, have been designed, in the context of deep societal divisions that are reflected in sport.

The first section of the chapter provides a framework for understanding the types of institutional arrangements for governance in deeply divided societies, drawing on the political science literature on conflict management. This framework suggests that two broad approaches, termed integration and accommodation, can be observed in the design of political institutions devised to manage inter-group conflict. The integration-accommodation framework is then used as a lens through which to assess the governance of sport in the three case studies. Each case study starts with a sketch of the political institutions employed to manage conflict in the country concerned, followed by analysis of the governance arrangements that exist in the sports sector. The rationale for this approach is to help understand not just the approach taken to the design of institutions of sports governance, but to do so in the context of considering the broader approach to managing conflict in each case. This analysis suggests that there has been a preference amongst a broad range of actors for integrative institutional designs for the governance of sport in each of the cases, and that this approach is at odds with the design of the same societies' political institutions, which are oriented more towards accommodation. In order to understand this preference, it is necessary to appreciate the power of rhetoric emphasising the social value of sport – as exemplified by

its incorporation into the Sustainable Development Goals – but also more practical considerations about the demands of international competition and the desire of local sports actors to secure access to this international realm. The chapter concludes by reflecting on opportunities for further research into the institutions of governance of sport in deeply divided societies and the role of different actors in establishing and reforming those institutions.

Institutional design in deeply divided societies: Integration versus accommodation

Before considering the specific issue of the governance of sport, it is necessary to briefly survey the broader literature on institutional design in deeply divided societies. A number of different attempts have been made to develop classifications, typologies or taxonomies of the types of institutions that are employed with the aim of managing conflict between groups.⁸ The range of designs identified is wide, incorporating strategies that attempt to eliminate divisions between groups by partitioning states along ethnic lines, for instance, through to those that attempt to make possible to peaceful sharing of states through granting territorial autonomy to groups or establishing political power sharing between them.

McGarry *et al.*'s summary of a range of approaches to institutional design helpfully places them on a scale between integration and accommodation.⁹ Integration, they suggest, 'turn[s] a blind eye to difference for public purposes', and its advocates 'believe political instability and conflict result from group-based partisanship in political institutions'¹⁰ and thus 'reject the idea that ethnic difference should necessarily translate into political differences'.¹¹ In this sense, integration is a liberal prescription for the depoliticisation of identities through the privatisation of cultural difference.¹² As Kuperman explains, integration 'aims to erode the political salience of groups that are distinguished by identity or location and instead promote a single, unifying nationality through more centralized institutions'.¹³ In such institutions,

integrationists argue, representation should be of individuals, rather than groups, and should be based on principles of meritocracy, difference blindness and impartiality, rather than descriptive representation. Integrationists are generally hostile to group-based political parties, and supportive of civil society organisations that transcend the relevant divisions in deeply divided societies. Moreover, while they may support the concept of a federal state, they do not favour federations composed of territorial units based on national, ethnic or linguistic criteria. Indeed, where relevant, they support unitary state designs over federal alternatives.¹⁴

According to McGarry *et al.*, accommodation, by contrast, as a minimum ‘requires the recognition of more than one ethnic, linguistic, national, or religious community in the state. It aims to secure the coexistence of different communities within the same state’.¹⁵ Accommodationists ‘insist that in certain contexts, national, ethnic, religious, and linguistic divisions and identities are resilient, durable, and hard’, and that ‘[p]olitical prudence and morality requires adaptation, adjustment, and consideration of the special interests, needs, and fears of groups so that they may regard the state in question as fit for them’.¹⁶ Accommodationist strategies of institutional design aim to provide guarantees to these groups ‘based on their distinct identity or geographic location, via mechanisms such as proportional representation, federalism, autonomy, quotas, economic redistribution, and veto power’.¹⁷ The accommodationist institutional design that is most prominent in the conflict management literature is a form of power sharing known as consociationalism.

Explained briefly, consociationalism describes a form of democracy in which divisions between groups in a plural society are managed through institutions that enable co-operation between the elite representatives of those social groups. In his influential work on consociational democracy, Arend Lijphart identified four key features characteristic of this

co-operation. These are elite level power sharing by means of a grand coalition, segmental cultural autonomy, proportionality between groups in public positions, and group veto rights over vital interests.¹⁸ More recent scholarship simplifies the definition to two key features: executive power sharing by representatives of the most significant segments of society, and territorial forms of self-governance.¹⁹

Most contemporary empirical research on consociationalism focuses, understandably, on its adoption via constitutions or peace agreements, either at the state or sub-state level. Some authors, however, have started to examine the impacts of the adoption of consociationalism in specific policy domains. Fontana, for instance, explores the interplay of Bosnia's consociational political institutions and cultural policy in the country, focusing particularly on the museums sector.²⁰ She argues that the emphasis placed on ethnic difference by Bosnia's constitutional arrangements has played out through a tendency for cultural institutions to emphasise and preserve parallel, as opposed to intersecting, group histories. Studying the governance of sport provides an opportunity to contribute to this expansion of the study of approaches to conflict management such as consociationalism, beyond the narrowly political arena that has been the focus of previous research.

Where might diplomacy fit into this research agenda, though? Early research on consociationalism tended to neglect the role of external actors in establishing power-sharing institutions, but as these have become a more prominent feature of post-conflict settlements, so the appreciation of the role of these actors in establishing and maintaining power sharing has grown.²¹ While McGarry *et al.* argue that integration is the dominant method of managing inter-group relations in established democracies – noting, for instance, that it is advocated by politicians as the best way to ‘manage’ Europe's immigrant populations²² – in post-conflict and other deeply divided societies, external actors frequently prescribe strategies

of accommodation. In particular, consociationalism has been promoted by a range of actors including the European Union and the United States,²³ and can now arguably be considered to be external actors' favoured method of managing group relations in post-conflict states.

The governance of sport in three deeply divided societies

Having identified the types of institutions that are employed to facilitate the governance of deeply divided societies, it is now possible to turn to the more specific issue of the governance of sport in such contexts. As a 'constitutive element of everyday life and popular culture',²⁴ sport is not insulated from the effects of conflict in societies that are deeply divided along national, ethnic, religious or linguistic lines. Indeed, contrary to the assumptions upon which SDP interventions are built, sport in deeply divided societies often serves to accentuate existing divisions.²⁵ As Sugden and Tomlinson argue, '[s]port in general, and football in particular, have proven to be significant theatres for the working up and expression of national unity, and its mobilized form, nationalism'.²⁶ Indeed, some authors claim that sport is *the* most powerful form that national performance can take.²⁷ Claims that sport contributed directly to the outbreak of violence in cases such as the El Salvador-Honduras 'soccer war' described by Kapuściński or the clashes between Dynamo Zagreb and Red Star Belgrade fans at the Maksimir stadium may be debateable,²⁸ but regardless of whether the working up of nationalism through sport played a role in the initiation of violence, in the aftermath of violent conflict, the very organisation of sport is very often left divided along the lines of conflicts.

While sport in deeply divided societies has been the subject of some research,²⁹ very little attention has been paid to how sport is governed in such contexts. Notable exceptions include Reiche's study of the relationship between sport and confessionalism in Lebanon,³⁰ Coppieters's investigation of the organisation of marathons in Brussels, Belfast, Beirut and

Jerusalem,³¹ a number of articles and working papers on the organisation of Northern Irish sport, including football and cycling,³² Vanreusel *et al.*'s study of the organisation of sport in Belgium,³³ and some works that consider the arrangements for the governance of football in Bosnia and Herzegovina.³⁴ It is with the case of Bosnia that our analysis starts.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

The case of the reestablishment of the institutions of governance of football in Bosnia following the end of the Bosnian War of 1992-1995, and their subsequent reform under international pressure, illustrates two important themes that are central to this chapter. First, the initial approach taken in order to facilitate the reunification of the sport was characterised by accommodation – allowing three different governing bodies that emerged from the conflict to remain in control of the game in their respective territories – but over time, both external actors and some local voices were successful in calling for a more integrative approach, which has seen the establishment of a single governing body for football in Bosnia. Second, the case illustrates the range of actors – both international and local – that are involved in sports diplomacy, broadly defined, and how the interests of these actors interact.

In order to be able to more fully understand the organisation of sport in Bosnia, it is first necessary to understand the broader political context of the country. War in Bosnia was precipitated by the country's independence from Yugoslavia in March 1992, although its roots can be traced back to Yugoslavia's first democratic regional elections in 1990, in which nationalists were swept to power in most of the constituent republics. According to the 1991 Yugoslav census, 43.7 per cent of the republic's population identified as Muslim (now more commonly termed Bosniak), 31.4 per cent as Serb, 17.3 per cent as Croat, 5.5 per cent as Yugoslav and 2.1 per cent as 'others and unknown'.³⁵ The war was initially fought between Bosnian government forces and Bosnian Serb paramilitaries, who opposed the country's

independence and were actively supported by Belgrade, and who sought to establish an independent Bosnian Serb state, which they hoped to later be able to unite with Serbia. Later in the war, conflict also erupted between Bosniak and Bosnian Croat forces as the latter attempted to gain control of territory in Croat-populated parts of Bosnia, supported by the nationalist political leadership in Zagreb, after the latter ousted the more moderate Bosnian Croat leadership.

When the Bosnian conflict was ended by the internationally brokered Dayton Agreement in 1995, that agreement established a new constitution for Bosnia. This constitution defined the country as a state composed of two entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska (RS), reflecting the division of the country at the end of the war. Extensive powers were reserved for the entities at the expense of the central Bosnian state. Each entity has its own president, government and parliament, and within the Federation power is further devolved to 10 cantons, each with its own parliament. The Dayton constitution guarantees ethnic representation by way of quotas at all levels of government and in the civil service. It also established veto rules whereby decisions of the House of Representatives (the lower house of the Parliamentary Assembly) require the votes of at least one third of the representatives of each entity, and decisions of the House of People (the upper house) can be vetoed by a majority of any of the Bosniak, Croat or Serb delegates. These three ethnic groups are identified by the constitution as Bosnia's 'constituent peoples'. The Agreement has been described as establishing a 'classic example of consociational settlement',³⁶ in which 'institutions correspond to an ideal-typical consociational democracy'.³⁷

In the past decade, a number of attempts have been made to reform the Dayton constitution, in response to criticisms that Bosnian political institutions are not only incredibly inefficient,

but also discriminate against citizens who do not belong to one of the recognised ‘constituent peoples’.³⁸ Critics argue that the consociational institutions introduced by Dayton have reinforced the salience of ethnic divisions in the country and have turned elections into ethnic censuses, since the constitution provides ethno-nationalist parties with little incentive to appeal beyond the boundaries of their own groups.³⁹ Attempts at externally incentivised constitutional reform have failed, however, precisely because of the intransigence of local actors who have a vested interest in the maintenance of the system that ensures their continued grip on power. Even if constitutional reform were to be successful, however, it would be unlikely to involve a significant move away from the consociational approach, since the reform proposals that have been advanced all ‘endorse some variation of Dayton’s basic compromise’.⁴⁰

At the end of the war in 1995, Bosnian sport was also left fractured along ethnic lines. In football, three distinct governing bodies emerged from the conflict, each running their own leagues.⁴¹ It was not until 2002 that a single football federation, the Nogometni/Fudbalski Savez Bosne i Hercegovine (N/FSBiH), was formed, under pressure from FIFA, UEFA and the International Olympic Committee. As Sterchele notes, the united federation resembled the Dayton model.⁴² The individual ‘ethnic’ federations continued to exist as sub-federations of the N/FSBiH, and a tripartite presidency and an executive committee composed of five members of each sub-committee were established.⁴³

This arrangement for the governance of sport, with its echoes of the consociationalism employed in the Bosnian constitution, was intended to be an interim measure. As UEFA’s head of sports legal services Marcel Benz told the football journalist Jonathan Wilson in 2011, UEFA were given assurances that, with time, the federation would adopt a single presidency in line with common international practice. Despite these assurances, progress

proved to be very slow, and the ‘interim’ governance arrangement started to pose problems for FIFA and UEFA, with statutes easily blocked due to the voting rules of the N/FSBiH executive committee and the federation being represented by three presidents at international congresses.⁴⁴ The N/FSBiH seemed unwilling or unable to tackle significant problems in the domestic game, and to respond to pressure from fans to tackle corruption. Fans had been protesting against the federation since the formation of the ‘BH Fanaticos’ group in 2000 – most notably in an incident in Oslo in March 2007, when they caused a delay of more than an hour to a match against Norway by throwing flares on to the pitch, in order to highlight the issue of corruption within the N/FSBiH.

In response to the problems facing the governance of football in Bosnia, in October 2010, FIFA and UEFA demanded reform of the N/FSBiH within six months, including a requirement that the tripartite presidency be replaced. This demand met with significant resistance. Bosnian Serb representatives within the N/FSBiH opposed reform for fear that it would put at risk their political autonomy, but there was also some resistance from Bosnian Croats, who claimed that FIFA’s actions were an insensitive foreign imposition.⁴⁵ When the deadline passed in April 2011 and reforms had not been agreed, the federation was suspended by FIFA and UEFA, meaning that the Bosnian national team and Bosnian clubs could not compete in international or European competition.

Even with the suspension, political opposition to reform remained. The RS president, Milorad Dodik, maintained that he was ‘against one president being elected for the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina in any state structure – you name it, even a bee-keeping association’.⁴⁶ FIFA’s Emergency Committee immediately imposed a ‘normalisation committee’ on the N/FSBiH and tasked it with making the required reforms. Headed by former Bosnian player Ivica Osim, within two months the committee adopted a new statute, allowing the suspension to be

lifted in late May 2011 and paving the way for the first single president in the federation's history to be elected in December 2012.⁴⁷ In a very short space of time, then, a combination of pressure from below, in the form of fan protests, and from FIFA and UEFA above, resulted in significant changes to the governance of football in Bosnia. This achievement was perhaps also dependent on a significant degree of luck, as FK Borac Banja Luka, from the capital of the RS, had just won their first Bosnian Premier League title, and would have been denied the chance to play in the qualifying rounds for the UEFA Champions League had the suspension not been lifted. Borac fans and officials lobbied for acceptance of the reforms, resulting in the overcoming of political resistance in the RS.⁴⁸ While the reasons for this apparent success may be complex, it is notable that whereas the international community has struggled for more than a decade to reform the Dayton constitution, reform of the governance of football in Bosnia has been achieved more quickly. Moreover, it has taken a significant step away from the consociational power-sharing approach of Dayton in a more integrative direction.⁴⁹ Understanding this outcome, as the analysis above suggests, requires that we understand the complex interaction of a range of actors – including national and sub-national federations, international governing bodies, fans' groups and politicians.

Cyprus

The division of sport on the island of Cyprus has a history that dates back much longer than the conflict that Bosnia experienced in the 1990s. Meaningful sporting competition involving both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots effectively ceased in the 1950s – long before the formal partition of the island in 1974 – and it is only recently that progress has been made towards the possible reunification of sport across the inter-communal divide. As in the Bosnian case, it is football in particular that has been in the international spotlight, thanks to FIFA-facilitated negotiations involving the country's two football federations. As the analysis

in this section demonstrates, however, the process underway in Cyprus is a more domestically driven one than that witnessed in Bosnia, with the main impetus for reunification coming from within the federations themselves. Before examining these recent developments in sport, however, it is again necessary to first understand the broader political context.

Cyprus became independent from the United Kingdom in 1960, following a period of conflict between the British authorities and Greek Cypriot guerrillas, who favoured unification with Greece. During the 1960s, there were several periods of inter-communal violence between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. In 1963, there was a constitutional breakdown, and the following year a United Nations peacekeeping force was established and tasked with preventing further violence. While tensions between the two communities diffused in the late 1960s, in 1974 the Greek military junta and the Cypriot National Guard ousted the Cypriot president in a coup. Turkey responded by launching an invasion, which captured the north of the island. Cyprus has remained divided ever since. The internationally recognised Republic of Cyprus government has effective control only of the south of the island, and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) is only recognised as a state by Turkey.

The most significant attempt to reunify the island came in the early 2000s, when United Nations-led negotiations resulted in a proposed plan for reunification, known as the Annan Plan, after the then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. The plan underwent a number of revisions before being put to a referendum in April 2004. In the public vote, the majority (65 per cent) of Turkish Cypriots backed the plan, but it was rejected on the Greek Cypriot side, by a wide majority of 76 per cent of voters.⁵⁰

Had it been adopted, the Annan Plan would have established a constitutional structure based on principles of federalism and consociationalism. The plan itself cited Switzerland as a

model for its proposed Cypriot constitution but, as Bose notes, it also resembled Bosnia's Dayton Agreement and Northern Ireland's Good Friday Agreement.⁵¹ The proposed constitution would have established a bicameral parliament with an upper house (the senate) whose seats would have been divided evenly between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, and a lower house (the chamber of deputies) made up of representatives of each constituent state in proportion to their populations, with each being guaranteed a minimum 25 per cent of the seats. While the Annan Plan foresaw decisions being made on the basis of a simple majority, in the senate this would have needed to include a quarter of the voting representatives of each state and for certain areas of critical interest, a special majority of at least 40 per cent of the senators from each state would have been required. A presidential council was to have been established, made up of nine members with the approval of at least 40 per cent of the senators of each state, including at least two members from each state. The president of this council would have acted as head of state and government, and the office of both president and vice-president would have alternated between representatives from the Greek and Turkish Cypriot states every 20 months, such that at any one time one of these offices was to be held by a Greek Cypriot and the other by a Turkish Cypriot.⁵²

The division of Cyprus since 1974 has had an inevitable impact on the organisation of sport on the island, not least because of the impossibility of most Cypriots crossing the so-called 'Green Line' that has divided the two communities geographically, at least until the easing of border restrictions in 2003.⁵³ In fact, as mentioned above, communal sporting division pre-dates the political and physical division of the island. Kartakoullis and Loizou note, for example, that the last season that Turkish Cypriot football teams competed in competitions organised by the Cyprus Football Association (CFA) was 1954-55, after which they were prevented from using sports facilities in the name of maintaining good community relations

in the context of the Greek Cypriot anti-colonialist struggle.⁵⁴ While this was supposed to be a temporary measure, until the potential for inter-communal violence was over, it resulted in the Turkish Cypriot teams forming their own federation, the Kıbrıs Türk Futbol Federasyonu (CTFA). Because FIFA and UEFA recognise only the CFA as the legitimate Cypriot football federation, and have turned down the CTFA's requests to be recognised as a member federation, Turkish Cypriot football has remained internationally isolated.⁵⁵

Since the 2004 referendum, however, there have been attempts to reunify the organisation of Cypriot football. Following the Greek Cypriot vote against the Annan Plan, the CTFA made a further attempt to join FIFA, and in meetings with FIFA officials, its representatives accepted a plan to recognise the authority of and join the CFA. The plan was opposed by Turkish Cypriot politicians, however, and this prevented any progress towards its implementation.⁵⁶ More recently, further FIFA-facilitated talks have taken place. In November 2013, following negotiations in Zurich, the CFA and the CTFA signed a provisional agreement which, if implemented, will result in the CTFA becoming a member of the CFA, thus unifying football governance on the island.⁵⁷ A year and a half later, in March 2015, CTFA officials announced that they were going ahead with plans to join the CFA.⁵⁸ This decision attracted criticism from the then TRNC deputy prime minister and Minister of Economy, Tourism, Culture and Sports, Serdar Denktaş, who threatened to cut off funding to clubs in the event of the implementation of the agreement. There is also opposition on the Greek side, with some clubs voting against the proposed merger in a secret ballot held by the CFA.⁵⁹ However, the election of Mustafa Akıncı as the new TRNC president in April 2015 has signalled a political environment more conducive to unification.⁶⁰ At the time of writing, the football agreement had yet to be implemented, in part due to complications regarding the legal status of the

CTFA.⁶¹ However, the intent to merge the two federations on the island now seems to be well established.

The type of institutional arrangement that is envisaged for unified Cypriot football differs significantly from those of Bosnia's interim arrangements discussed above. While the text of the provisional agreement does not specify the exact arrangements to be adopted, one of its provisions is that the CFA will recognise the competence of the CTFA to organise its own competitions amongst its member clubs. As such, no joint league is envisaged.⁶² In this sense, the arrangement is more limited than that of Bosnia, where a unified league structure was created. This difference is more a reflection of the significant financial gulf between the relatively well financed Greek Cypriot clubs and their Turkish Cypriot counterparts, which are semi-professional at most and largely dependent on state funding, than it is of a desire to accommodate the identities of the two parties, however. No new association would be formed either; rather, the CTFA would become a member of the existing CFA. Unlike in Bosnia, the CTFA would not be guaranteed representation through a power-sharing presidency. In their provisional agreement, the two bodies agreed to the establishment of a steering committee to consider how Turkish Cypriot representation in the CFA's committees and assembly would be ensured. As of September 2015, it was envisaged that this representation will be on the same basis as that of each of the existing divisions of the Greek Cypriot leagues.⁶³

Another significant difference between the Cyprus case and that of Bosnia concerns the motivations of the domestic actors. Whereas in the case of the eventual reform of the interim governance arrangements in Bosnia, local actors (with the notable exception of fans) were resistant to reform and a solution was imposed from outside through FIFA's intervention, in Cyprus the initiative to unify the two federations is a largely domestic initiative. While FIFA has facilitated talks between the parties, the main driver of progress has been the CTFA's

concern to end the international isolation of Turkish Cypriot football. The association's president has written that the agreement reached in Zurich in November 2013 promises to end 'more than three decades of isolation' and 'to give hope to our clubs, to our players and above all to our youth who all strive to gain access to this global village of the sport called football'.⁶⁴

Northern Ireland

Our final case study is Northern Ireland. As the analysis will show, this case has also been characterised by an approach to the governance of sport that can be categorised as integrative, and which notably also stands in contrast to the power-sharing approach that has formed the basis for the political settlement of the wider conflict. However, whereas the two cases discussed so far have illustrated varying degrees of involvement of international governing bodies, the Northern Ireland case is one where the governance of sport has been a largely domestic affair – albeit with cross-border Irish dimensions.

In order to understand the context of the governance of sport in Northern Ireland, it is necessary to first consider the history of the state. While the partition of Ireland in 1921 created a Northern Irish state that had a comfortable Protestant majority who supported continued union with the United Kingdom, it did not resolve the conflict between those Protestant unionists and nationalists, overwhelmingly from the Catholic minority, who instead preferred a united Ireland. It was not until the late 1960s, however, that this conflict escalated into what became known as 'the Troubles' – a 30-year violent conflict fought between republican paramilitaries (most notably the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA)) on one side and the British state and loyalist paramilitaries on the other. During this period, around 3,600 people were killed, making the Troubles Western Europe's most deadly conflict since the end of the Second World War.

Significant progress was made towards peace during the 1990s, with an IRA ceasefire declared in 1994, and since the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, Northern Ireland has been governed under an arrangement in which significant powers are devolved from the United Kingdom government to a power-sharing administration in Belfast. The text of the agreement acknowledges ‘the substantial differences between our continuing, and equally legitimate, political aspirations’, but states that ‘we will endeavour to strive in every practical way towards reconciliation and rapprochement within the framework of democratic and agreed arrangements’. It established the Northern Ireland Assembly and a number of transnational bodies such as the North/South Ministerial Council and the British-Irish Council, in order to commit the parties to ‘partnership, equality and mutual respect as the basis of relationships within Northern Ireland, between North and South, and between these islands’.⁶⁵ Northern Ireland’s political institutions, established in 1998 and revised by the October 2006 St Andrews Agreement, ‘are widely agreed to be consociational in nature, albeit with external federal and confederal aspects’.⁶⁶

Executive power in the Northern Ireland Assembly is shared according to electoral strength. The electoral system is proportional, and ministerial portfolios are automatically allocated by a mathematical formula. All members of the assembly must designate themselves as ‘unionist’, ‘nationalist’ or ‘other’. The executive is headed by a first minister and a deputy first minister, and these roles are allocated to the leaders of the first and second largest parties in the assembly, providing that these two parties do not belong to the same community bloc. There are also voting rules within the assembly designed to ensure cross-community support for legislative decisions, with important decisions requiring the support of majority of both unionist and nationalist members as well as an overall majority, or the support of at least 40 per cent of the members of each bloc and a 60 per cent overall majority.⁶⁷

Whereas the design of Northern Ireland's political institutions is very clearly premised on the accommodation of unionist and nationalist identities and interests, the organisation of sport in Northern Ireland is arguably more integrative (even if individual sports have been associated more with one particular community than the other). Many sports are in fact organised on an all-Ireland basis, with international representation based on teams that span Northern Ireland and the Republic.⁶⁸ Rugby, for example, has been organised on this basis since before Irish independence in 1922, and this model survived the partition that accompanied independence. Whyte observes that 'middle-class' sports including rugby, tennis and golf are more likely to be all-Ireland in their organisation than 'proletarian' sports such as cycling and (association) football (Gaelic sports, he argues, 'have always kept as a matter of principle to an all-Ireland basis').⁶⁹

Cycling provides an interesting example here, because there used to be three governing bodies for the sport on the island of Ireland. As Howard explains, two of these, the Northern Ireland Cycling Federation (NICF) and the Irish Cycling Federation (ICF), were recognised as national governing bodies by the Union Cycliste International (UCI), whereas the third, the all-island National Cycling Association (NCA), was not.⁷⁰ In the late 1980s, it was proposed that the three bodies be merged to form the Federation of Irish Cyclists (FIC), although a vote of the membership of the NICF did not achieve the required two-thirds majority to approve this. Individual cycling clubs responded by leaving the NICF and forming the FIC-affiliated Ulster Cycling Federation, which was recognised by the Sports Council for Northern Ireland as the official governing body. The FIC became the only governing body recognised by the UCI. While the NICF continued to resist integration of the sport across the border for many years,⁷¹ in December 2006 its membership voted in favour of joining the Ulster Cycling Federation.⁷²

The organisational split in football, meanwhile, remains, with Northern Ireland and the Republic maintaining separate leagues and national teams. However, within Northern Ireland, attempts have been made to make football more inclusive, in order to address the perception that Northern Irish football is dominated by unionist interests. In April 2000, the British government set up an Advisory Panel to the Minister of Culture, Arts and Leisure to create a strategy for football in Northern Ireland. The report of the Advisory Panel noted that many Catholics felt uncomfortable and unsafe at international matches (it is notable that many Catholic players opt to represent the Republic of Ireland instead of Northern Ireland), and that sectarian conflict amongst fans was a barrier to improving community relations through football. Nonetheless, the report noted that football enjoys significant support across the community divide, and offers possibilities for cross-community reconciliation. It recommended the adoption of an anti-sectarianism strategy to enable this potential to be realised.⁷³ As Bairner explains, '[a]s football could not be allowed to appear to operate under the hegemonic control of unionists, political encouragement was voiced for integrationist strategies aimed at making support for the Northern Ireland "national" team more inclusive'.⁷⁴

However, Bairner suggests that this approach contrasts with, and is potentially undermined by, the broader political and institutional context in Northern Ireland. He argues that attempts to make sport more inclusive 'are expected to bear fruit in a political context in which sectarian differences have been legitimized and even given formal recognition through those very mechanisms that are intended to help create a more peaceful and less polarized Northern Ireland',⁷⁵ referring to the consociational nature of the Good Friday Agreement. He concludes that 'in the world of sport, citizens are being asked to set aside the trappings of cultural difference in the interests of social inclusion and cross-community integration', but that 'the

resultant policies are fundamentally at odds with those that have been promoted in other areas of society, not least in the political process itself', where societal divisions have instead been institutionalised.⁷⁶ As in both Bosnia and Cyprus, then, prescriptions for the governance of sport are significantly more integrationist than those for the broader political management of conflict.

In search of explanations: Conclusions and directions for further research

In all three of the cases outlined above, the empirical evidence presented suggests that the governance of sport is more integrative, or at least has been moving in a more integrative direction, than the wider political institutions of the country concerned. How can we explain this pattern? What explanations might we pursue when attempting to explain why national and international sports governing bodies have pressed for more integrative governance arrangements than we find employed in constitutions and peace agreements?

One explanation is that this approach might partly reflect the rhetorical impact of the claims that sports administrators frequently make about the supposed unifying impact of sport. For example, Eick has argued that, '[i]n marketing football publicly including its political role, FIFA emphasizes football's social use-value and constantly highlights the capacity of football to boost "social cohesion" as stated in the FIFA objectives: "to improve the game of football constantly and promote it globally in the light of its unifying, educational, cultural and humanitarian values"'.⁷⁷ Indeed, this rhetoric now extends beyond the world of FIFA and other sports governing bodies, as reflected in its incorporation into the declaration of the Sustainable Development Goals. Applied to the Bosnian case, it could be argued that when presented with evidence of division, politicisation and corruption in Bosnian football, FIFA and UEFA could hardly not act, given their rhetoric that sport has the power to unify.⁷⁸ One avenue of further investigation might therefore be to examine whether a form of 'rhetorical

entrapment'⁷⁹ is associated with the importance that international organisations have attached to sport for development and peace, regardless of the extent to which they actually believe in this discourse.

We should not overlook more pragmatic explanations of the actions of both international and national governing bodies. The organisation of international sport, which is premised on the representation of states by national teams, does not sit easily with local arrangements that seek to accommodate societal divisions through the existence of multiple governing bodies. There is a clear mismatch between the various forms of autonomy associated with accommodationist strategies of conflict management and the demands of international governing bodies, which, due to the nature of international sport, are likely to prefer unitary national governing bodies. In the Bosnian example, a clear motivation behind FIFA and UEFA's attempts to reform the N/FSBiH was not the desire to contribute to more harmonious inter-ethnic relations (though that might be part of the explanation), but to address concerns about Bosnia's undue influence on the international stage that stemmed from its federation's tripartite presidency, and to tackle the considerable problems that existed within the domestic game. Pragmatic concerns also help to explain the CTFA's commitment to joining the Cyprus Football Association and unifying football governance on the island. As noted above, while the CTFA have faced significant opposition to this plan from some Turkish Cypriot politicians, they continue to pursue the goal of merging with the CFA as a way of ending the almost complete isolation of Turkish Cypriot football.

These concerns suggest that the integrative direction of sports governance, in the three case studies presented here, might not be a deliberate alternative to more accommodative approaches to conflict management such as consociationalism, so much as a pragmatic response to the demands of international competition. Further research should investigate not

only the ways in which sport is governed in deeply divided societies, but also the driving forces behind the establishment of different institutional designs in the governance of sport. Here, there is also a need to more fully appreciate the relative importance of different actors, at both the national and international level. While FIFA and UEFA's suspension of the Bosnian football federation in order to tackle governance concerns stemming from ethnic division might be unique (Meier and García suggest that by far the most common trigger of such interventions is instead government interference),⁸⁰ there are perhaps subtler forms of international influence over national governing bodies that are worth investigating. The Bosnian case also highlights the potential importance of pressure from below – that is to say, from sports fans.

Rofo has noted the large number of actors (or players, to use his sporting analogy) involved in sports diplomacy.⁸¹ The cases considered here demonstrate the need to take into account the motivations and interests of these different actors, and how they interact to produce the types of institutional outcomes that we witness. As a comparison of the Bosnian and Cypriot football experiences demonstrates, the motivations of local actors can differ significantly from case to case, even where the outcomes might be superficially similar. Whereas in Bosnia, FIFA and UEFA (along with fans) faced resistance to reform from within the country's football federation, in Cyprus the initiative to unify the governance of the game on the island has been driven by the local federations – and the CTFA in particular. In both the Bosnian and Cypriot cases, however, nationalist political elites have voiced their opposition to closer integration.

Another question that might inform further research into the governance of sport in deeply divided societies concerns the effects of these governance arrangements on broader issues of conflict and identity, and would thus serve to link this research back to the concerns of the

sport for development and peace literature. If, as discussed earlier in this chapter, the aim of integrationist approaches to institutional design is to promote a shared sense of identity through the adoption of centralised institutions, then what impact do these types of institutions have when employed in the governance of sport? Will a unified Cypriot football federation promote a stronger sense of Cypriot identity, transcending Greek and Turkish Cypriot ethnic identities, amongst players and fans of the sport? Alternatively, might unified institutions in sport simply be the exception to the rule, and co-exist alongside continued societal division? The latter possibility is exemplified by the case of football in Northern Ireland, where there are ‘signs of a Northern Irish football consciousness, perhaps, but not of an emergent Northern Irish political consciousness, far less a “national” identity’.⁸² In the Bosnian case, while headlines in international media coverage of the national football team’s appearance at the 2014 World Cup may have suggested a country uniting behind the multi-ethnic team,⁸³ the reality is somewhat more complex, with many Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats indeed supporting the Bosnian national team, but often as a secondary team to that of Serbia or Croatia.⁸⁴

While ‘sport for development and peace’ initiatives appear to have captured the attention of a significant number of scholars from across the social sciences in the past decade, those political scientists with an interest in sport have so far largely neglected the question of how sport is governed in deeply divided societies. This is perhaps surprising, given the attention that has been paid in general to questions of institutional design in such societies. This chapter set out to address this gap in the literature and, in doing so, has demonstrated the integrative direction of sports governance in Bosnia, Cyprus and Northern Ireland. It has provided some tentative explanations for why integrative institutions have emerged in sport, in the context of environments where political institutions are characterised more by

accommodation than integration. Some of the issues highlighted here, such as the relationship between local and international actors and between institutions and identities, speak to important debates within political science, international relations and the study of diplomacy, and will hopefully provoke further comparative research into the governance of sport in deeply divided societies.

Endnotes

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⁷ I am indebted to Jasmin Mujanović for his previous work with me on the Bosnian case, and to Constantinos Adamides, Nicos Kartakoullis, Christina Loizou and Sertaç Sonan for discussions on the Cyprus case. Dario Brentin provided helpful feedback and suggestions on an earlier draft of this chapter.

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- ⁷⁹ T. Risse and K. Sikkink, 'The socialization of international human rights norms into domestic practices: Introduction', in T. Risse, S. C. Ropp and K. Sikkink (eds), *The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); F. Schimmelfennig, 'The community trap: Liberal norms, rhetorical action, and the eastern enlargement of the European Union', *International Organization*, 55:1 (2001).
- ⁸⁰ Meier and García, 'Protecting private transnational authority against public intervention', pp. 895-97.
- ⁸¹ J. S. Rofo, 'Sport and diplomacy: A global diplomacy framework', *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, 27:2 (2016).

⁸² Bairner, 'Sport, the Northern Ireland peace process, and the politics of identity', p. 225. There has been some discussion of the potential emergence of a 'Northern Irish' identity in the context of the results of the 2011 census, which was the first to ask about national identity and in which a fifth of respondents answered that they were Northern Irish only, rather than British or Irish. However, the political significance of this development has been disputed. See L. Clarke, 'One in five see themselves as Northern Irish: Change in who we think we are', *Belfast Telegraph* (12 December 2012), available at <http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/opinion/news-analysis/one-in-five-see-themselves-as-northern-irish-change-in-who-we-think-we-are-29004537.html>, accessed 26 May 2017; F. O'Toole, 'After Brexit, the two tribes recede –and a Northern Irish identity emerges', *The Observer* (12 March 2017), available at <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/mar/12/brexit-own-goal-changes-politics-northern-ireland>, accessed 26 May 2017; K. McNicholl, 'The "Northern Irish" identity is no new dawn', *The Detail* (3 April 2017), available at <http://www.thedetail.tv/articles/the-northern-irish-identity-is-no-new-dawn>, accessed 26 May 2017; K. McNicholl, 'Political constructions of a cross-community identity in a divided society: How politicians articulate Northern Irishness', *National Identities* (forthcoming).

⁸³ See, for example, D. Sito-Sucic, 'Bosnia's divided people unite behind World Cup bid', Reuters (14 October 2014), available at <http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-soccer-world-bosnia-idUKBRE99D08Y20131014>, accessed 10 January 2016; E. Vulliamy, 'How Edin Džeko united Bosnia', *The Observer* (8 June 2014), available at <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/08/edin-dzeko-united-bosnia-world-cup>, accessed 10 January 2016.

⁸⁴ E. K. Vest, 'The War of Positions: Football in Post-Conflict Bosnia-Herzegovina' (PhD thesis, Brunel University, 2014), pp. 256-57. See also Reiche, 'War minus the shooting?', for a discussion of the complex relationship between sport, sectarianism and national identity in Lebanon.