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# “Simply a Little Piece of GDR History”?

*The Role of Memorialization in Post-Socialist*

*Transitional Justice in Germany*

Sara Jones

Focusing on the Berlin Stasi prison memorial, Gedenkstätte Berlin-Hohenschönhausen*,* this article considers the role that memorialization might play in transitional justice as a form of symbolic reparation situated between vengeance and forgiveness. Through narrative analysis of interviews with former political prisoners, it traces the importance of memorialization for victims of human rights abuses in terms of a personal and collective coming to terms with the past. It connects understandings of transitional justice with social and cultural memory studies and demonstrates the dynamic interaction between different levels of memory that can take place at sites of conscience.

*We expected justice, but we got the Rechtsstaat instead.*

Bärbel Bohley

The oft-cited dictum of former East German dissident and civil rights activist Bärbel Bohley expresses succinctly the frustration and dissatisfaction felt by many victims of the GDR regime with regard to the legal measures taken against those responsible for human rights abuses in the East German state.[[1]](#endnote-1) Nonetheless, when the German case is compared with efforts to deal with state socialist pasts elsewhere in the region, the sentiment that Germany in some respects failed those who suffered under the SED regime may appear unfounded.[[2]](#endnote-2) As noted by a number of scholars, the incorporation of East Germany into the long-established democracy of the Federal Republic meant the instant availability of political and legal structures capable (also in financial terms) of addressing the crimes committed under the previous regime.[[3]](#endnote-3) Perhaps of equal importance, the newly united Germany saw political will at both an elite and popular level to bring the perpetrators of state violence to justice, often with reference to perceived inadequacies in dealing with the National Socialist past after 1945.[[4]](#endnote-4)

Indeed, the Federal Republic might be viewed as the “leader” in post-socialist central and eastern Europe in terms of what is widely described as “transitional justice”: that is, the “response to systematic or widespread violations of human rights,” which “seeks recognition for victims and promotion of possibilities for peace, reconciliation and democracy.”[[5]](#endnote-5) Germany put into place a wide range of transitional justice measures, including trials against representatives of the SED regime, opening of the Stasi files, lustration, reparations, restoration of property, and truth commissions in the form of the two Commissions of Enquiry dealing with the GDR in 1992–94 and 1995–98.[[6]](#endnote-6) Nonetheless, Bohley’s frustration, along with that of many other victims of SED repression, was in fact with the very structures that permitted these relatively rapid attempts to deal with the East German dictatorship. It was frequently the rule of law itself, an essential component of democratic societies, that prevented punishment of the perpetrators to the extent deemed adequate by the victims. Notably, the prohibition on retroactive justice and the emphasis on individual, rather than collective guilt meant that judges and prosecutors had to negotiate a complex position between punishing those responsible without infringing on the democratic structures for which many of the victims had fought.[[7]](#endnote-7)

However, there is a further form of transitional justice, which can complement the efforts of courts and tribunals, and yet which exists outside of the judicial and political constraints associated with these methods: memorialization. Frederic Mégret argues that memorials have “a key role to play in bridging legal concepts of victim reparation, humanitarian ideas of victim assistance and the larger needs of transitional societies.”[[8]](#endnote-8) Indeed, memorialization has become an important aspect of transitional justice in post-conflict societies across the globe, although its significance may not always be recognized.[[9]](#endnote-9) Where its role is valued, the building of memorials and museums is frequently seen as a central part of acknowledging human rights abuses, which can in turn contribute to greater awareness of past suffering and the authoritarian structures in which this suffering took place. Moreover, sites of memorialization and the organizations behind them can play a vital role in “truth telling,” contributing not only to a sense of social justice for victims, but also offering a form of social empowerment to previously marginalized groups.[[10]](#endnote-10) In their recent volume on the role of memorials in times of transition, Susanne Buckley-Zistel and Stefanie Schäfer list the potential functions of memorialization as “vindicating the dignity of victims; stimulating open debates amongst past injustices; contributing to conflict transformation; strengthening resistance against the dominating narrative about the past and/or forgetting thereof; aiding in building a new and cohesive nation on the ruins of the past; and providing a place for private reflection and mourning.”[[11]](#endnote-11)

Nonetheless, despite growing acknowledgement of the importance of remembering the past and offering symbolic reparations in this way, “exactly how memorialization supports social reconstruction or transitional justice is not well documented.”[[12]](#endnote-12) Brandon Hamber, Liz Ševčenko and Ereshnee Naidu seek to bridge this gap through developing a model for assessing the impact of memorialization on young people, educators and nongovernmental organizations. This fits with their view of memorials as contributing to the building of “a larger culture of peace” and results in some useful conclusions.[[13]](#endnote-13) However, it does not address the function of memorials for the victims of human rights abuses and the impact of such sites on those in whose name they are erected; that is, whether memorialization does indeed result in an increased sense of social justice and empowerment as argued in the research literature. This topic is addressed in Julia Viebach’s recent essay on memorials in Rwanda. Viebach considers the function of memorials from the perspective of those “inside” them, that is, survivors who work in and look after these sites of conscience, as well as what she terms the “outer dimension” of memorials as places of “memory truth” and “memory justice.” She offers insight into the function of memorials for victims in terms of preventing forgetting and as a form of symbolic punishment; however, as she notes herself, the essay does not consider how “the outside has influenced the messages that are transported through the memorials as well.”[[14]](#endnote-14) Thus the socio-political dimension of memorialization and the embedding of the memorials in other memory narratives available in a given context remain underdeveloped in Viebach’s approach.

But what is it that victims want from transitional justice? Bohley’s statement that those who suffered under the SED regime wanted “justice,” but remained unsatisfied by the decisions of the courtroom, indicates a desire for what might be considered “vengeance” in Martha Minow’s use of the term, that is, as “the impulse to retaliate when wrongs are done.” Vengeance, Minow argues, is not necessarily a negative response borne of anger; retribution is a way for the community to correct “the wrongdoer’s false message that the victim was less worthy or valuable than the wrongdoer.”[[15]](#endnote-15) Inadequate societal retribution against those who committed human rights abuses might thus suggest to the victim that the community is not only indifferent to their suffering, but that it also continues to recognize the perpetrator’s designation of the victim as—in the case of former political prisoners—criminal. Vengeance can, however, as Minow points out, be a destructive emotion, as it continues “to imprison the victim in horror, degradation, and the bounds of the perpetrator’s violence.” Minow juxtaposes vengeance with “forgiveness,” which can promote reconciliation and “break cycles of violence” at an individual and societal level. However, forgiveness can only come from those directly affected; it cannot be commanded from without. Community-level responses, such as amnesties, may suggest a need to forget, which would be unacceptable for victims of mass or state violence. Minow thus asks “what responses do or could lie between vengeance and forgiveness”?[[16]](#endnote-16) In this article, I will explore whether memorial museums might be one such response through examining victim perceptions of the memorial museum Gedenkstätte Berlin-Hohenschönhausen. The discussion will be based on close analysis of a selection of unstructured interviews with former political prisoners carried out by the site’s eyewitness office between 2006 and 2009. Why do victims become involved with memorialization? How does it impact on their understanding of the past? How do their memories of the past interact or conflict with the narrative of history conveyed to the visiting public? What is the relationship between this narrative and alternative representations of the past outside of the memorial space?

## Memory studies and transitional justice

In responding to these questions, I seek to bridge a further gap in the research literature by bringing together discussions on the role of memorials in transitional justice with theoretical approaches to social and cultural memory studies. Alexandra Barahona de Brito notes that “for the most part, studies of transitional justice, which are part of the comparative politics and political science family, and memory studies, that emerge from sociology, cultural studies and psychology, have not crossed paths.”[[17]](#endnote-17) She provides useful impulses for how these two domains might be linked, particularly through the concept of “mnemonic communities” which can highlight “the fact that people do not act only according to strategic calculations, but in the light of the memories and narratives they have adopted and that make sense to them as members of a particular ‘memory group’.” She sees transitional justice as an aspect of the “politics of memory,” which is played out amongst and between these different mnemonic communities and which is part of “much broader processes of socialization and identity formation” than the temporally limited policies and actions that constitute the focus of political science approaches.[[18]](#endnote-18) In this vein, we might see those with a particular experience of state-mandated repression in the GDR as a “mnemonic community,” whose approach to transitional justice and, in particular, memorialization is based not only on strategic political calculation, but also on their memories of this repression.

However, absent from this approach is an understanding of the dynamic nature of memory, including personal memories, which are constituted not only by past events, but also by contemporary context. As Halbwachs observed as early as 1925, while mnemonic communities are formed on the basis of shared memories, the meaning ascribed to these memories is constructed through their narration and representation in the present moment.[[19]](#endnote-19) This can become starkly apparent at and after moments of transition, when understandings of the past are particularly subject to deconstruction and reconstruction by different social groups.[[20]](#endnote-20) It is here that Francesca Lessa’s recent contribution to understanding the links between memory and transitional justice can be of use. Lessa develops the concept of “memory narratives,” which she describes as diverse attempts “to make sense of the events that are unfolding and to articulate them in a meaningful form.” She notes that different social actors produce, sustain and fight for different memory narratives, which “acquire different levels of legitimacy and appeal within society depending on how compellingly such narratives present a contested past.” Memory narratives and transitional justice policies are mutually constitutive: the memory narratives within a given society can influence choices that are made at the political level, yet at the same time, specific transitional justice measures can produce or change memory narratives.[[21]](#endnote-21)

Thus Lessa would perhaps agree with Olick that “we live in a society of narratives.”[[22]](#endnote-22) However, her model, grounded in political science approaches to memory and transitional justice, suggests an understanding of cause and effect, action and reaction, which might not do justice to the complex dynamics of remembering in heterogeneous societies. Similarly, while Buckley-Zistel and Schäfer’s recent edited volume is a welcome advance in efforts to bring together memory studies with transitional justice scholarship, their view of memorials appears to be one of storage technologies. While the authors recognize that memory and interpretation are always fluid and subject to contestation, they describe the role of sites of conscience as providing “a material container or medium that is crucial for storing or accessing” the past.[[23]](#endnote-23) This approach thus suggests that memory can in fact be fixed and neglects the crucial role of the memorial as medium and mediator as well as the interaction between different types of memory at sites of conscience.

In contrast, in his work on collective memory and politics in Germany, Olick proposes a model based on “process-relationalism,” in which the focus is on “*figurations of memory—*developing relations between past and present—where images, contexts, traditions and interests come together in fluid, though not necessarily harmonious, ways, rather than to measure collective memory as an independent or dependent variable, a thing determined or determining.”[[24]](#endnote-24) Understanding remembering as both a process and as relational in this sense might reveal the ways in which individual memory narratives of state repression construct processes of transitional justice and yet are simultaneously (trans)formed by them. In the same vein, it can be seen how shared memories might build collective identities, but at the same time how identification with a particular socially defined group can have an impact on the meaning an individual gives to narratives about the past.[[25]](#endnote-25) The response of victims of past human rights abuses to civil society and state-mandated efforts to commemorate this suffering can reveal some of these mechanisms. In this way, an analysis of this form of transitional justice can contribute to memory studies as an interdisciplinary field, just as memory studies can contribute to an investigation of this form of transitional justice.

## Gedenkstätte berlin-hohenschönhausen

The site that forms the focus of this study, Gedenkstätte Berlin-Hohenschönhausen*,* might best be termed a “memorial museum,” that is, a place that combines both “a moral framework to the narration of terrible historical events and more in-depth contextual explanations to commemorative acts.”[[26]](#endnote-26) It is situated in the former remand prison of the State Security Service (Stasi) in Berlin, the largest such facility in the GDR. The Stasi remand prisons differed from other sites of incarceration in that they housed almost exclusively political prisoners, who were held without trial and interrogated often for months on end by highly trained Stasi officers. The “crimes” these individuals were supposed to have committed ranged from attempting to leave the GDR illegally to the formation of and involvement in oppositional groups. In the early years of the GDR, and particularly before official de-Stalinization, the prisons were sites of physical violence and abuse, nightly interrogations, and poor sanitation. In the 1960s and 1970s, physical violence—though not entirely absent—was largely replaced with psychological terror and isolation, including lack of knowledge on the part of the prisoner of how long the interrogations would last and often even of where they were being held.

The site at Hohenschönhausen was used as a Special Camp (*Speziallager*) by the Soviet occupation in the immediate postwar period, a central remand prison of the Soviet People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) and Ministry for Internal Affairs (MVD) between 1946 and 1951, and as the central remand prison of the Ministry for State Security (MfS) from 1951 to 1989. It is made up of the underground “submarine” prison used in the 1950s and the “New Building” used in the 1960s, ’70s and ’80s. The complex was finally closed in 1990. Pressure from former prisoners and citizens’ rights activists halted plans to continue use of the site as a day release prison and the Berlin Senate recommended that it be converted into a memorial in October 1991. Financial considerations and political controversies meant that plans for the site were slow to develop; however, on December 1, 1995, the Berlin Senate authorized the formation of a memorial foundation supported equally by federal and regional funds. In 1998, the second Commission of Enquiry relating to the GDR past recommended permanent financial support for the memorial at both federal and regional levels and in 2000 the Berlin Parliament passed the Law for the Creation of the Foundation “Gedenkstätte Berlin-Hohenschönhausen.” The historian Hubertus Knabe has been director of the memorial since December 2000.[[27]](#endnote-27)

While the memorial has seen considerable professionalization and shifts in its political framing since its opening in 1994 (initially being made accessible with the support of victim organizations), the basic principles remain the same: visitor groups are guided around the site, most frequently by a former political prisoner. The insistence that the site be viewed by means of a guided tour is in part the result of practical considerations—the buildings are not safe for individuals to view alone;[[28]](#endnote-28) however, the combination of personal and historical narratives is also viewed as an effective method of conveying the place’s significance and the violence suffered there.[[29]](#endnote-29) A large permanent exhibition has been planned since the formation of the foundation in 2000 and was opened in October 2013.[[30]](#endnote-30)

The political narrative and focus of the new exhibition is characteristic of those of the memorial as a whole. There is an emphasis on eyewitness accounts throughout the display and, indeed, the exhibition begins and ends with audio-visual testimony. The largest room in the exhibition contains a chronological narrative of the history of the GDR and of the memorial: the account begins by asserting that the end of the war represented “the start of a communist experiment that for many becomes a nightmare.” The more brutal early years of the GDR dominate, with the period 1945–53 being accorded the same amount of space as the period from the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961 to the formation of the Foundation Berlin-Hohenschönhausen in 2000. It is repeatedly pointed out that neither Stasi head Erich Mielke nor any of “his employees at the remand center” received custodial sentences for their actions. Perhaps most suggestively, the thematic sections that are set alongside the chronological account—with the titles “Imprisonment,” “Violence,” “Interrogation,” “Surveillance” and “Self-assertion”—combine the history of the prison with the history of the GDR. Thus under “Imprisonment” the visitor is informed that “the feeling of being walled-in becomes a source of trauma for many East Germans.” Under “Surveillance,” control of the detainees in Hohenschönhausen is set alongside the Stasi’s efforts to gather information on other GDR citizens. In this way, the exhibition suggests that Hohenschönhausen can be viewed as a microcosm of life in the GDR in its entirety.[[31]](#endnote-31)

In this regard, the memorial can be seen as offering a counter-narrative to alternative popular images of the GDR that focus not on repression and control but on everyday life, material culture, social and economic security and historical progress. Memories of these varied phenomena—and the cultural artefacts that reflect them, from television shows to themed bars and cafés—are frequently grouped under the heading of “Ostalgie,” nostalgia for the East.[[32]](#endnote-32) The authors of a study in 2007 by the Forschungsverbund SED-Staat at the Freie Universität Berlin suggest that this softer image of the GDR is, in fact, dominant in east German family narratives. They note not only a worrying level of ignorance regarding basic historical facts but also an (in their view) overvaluing of the GDR’s social system and a refusal to characterize the East German state as a dictatorship.[[33]](#endnote-33) The most recent version of the Federal Memorial Concept—which outlines the basis of federal financial support for memorials and museums dealing with the National Socialist and SED dictatorships—similarly emphasizes a need to represent everyday life in the GDR in such a way as to avoid such “glorification and trivialization.”[[34]](#endnote-34)

Indeed, on its website and in its activity reports, Gedenkstätte Berlin-Hohenschönhausen can be seen to position itself explicitly in opposition to such “Ostalgie.” In 2010, the Memorial had a link on its homepage to “Myths and Facts about the GDR.” Under this rubric, the authors of the website aimed to demonstrate that the GDR was indeed a dictatorship and that the East German educational and economic systems were not better than those of the Federal Republic in the same period.[[35]](#endnote-35) In the first activity report, Knabe describes these kinds of memories as the “hear-say” [Hörensagen] upon which the younger generation bases their understanding of the East German state.[[36]](#endnote-36) Moreover, the Memorial has found itself in public conflict with those who represent an even more extreme counterview to that presented in its exhibition: notably, in 2006, at an event in Berlin-Lichtenberg to discuss placards marking the restricted area that once lay around the prison, former Stasi officers insulted a number of those who had been detained at the site and demanded the closure of the memorial.[[37]](#endnote-37)

Alongside the public work of the memorial museum, Gedenkstätte Berlin-Hohenschönhausen is also engaged in research, principally in the form of gathering material and documentary evidence relating to the history of the site. Importantly in the present context, the memorial views the collection and archiving of autobiographical accounts of former prisoners as a central part of its work.[[38]](#endnote-38) This takes place via the “eyewitness office” (Zeitzeugenbüro), which functions as a point of contact for former detainees and their families and which aims to identify by name all those interned in the prison. Moreover, where possible, staff in the eyewitness office conduct and record oral history interviews with the former prisoners, which are then stored in audiovisual and transcribed form in the eyewitness archive. In December 2010, I was given access to ten of these interviews, which had been released for the purposes of research on the understanding that anonymity would be maintained.

## The method of narrative enquiry

How can these interview texts be approached as research data? If, as Olick states, “we live in a society of narratives,” and if narrative emplotment is essential to processes of memory—be it grand collective stories relating to the national self, or personal accounts of individual experience—then the method of narrative enquiry would seem particularly appropriate for an investigation of how accounts of the past interact. Narrative analysis, already well established in the humanities, has become an ever more accepted (if still highly contested) method in the social sciences.[[39]](#endnote-39) The development of the method has also resulted in some fruitful crossover between literary interpretation and social enquiry.[[40]](#endnote-40)

In her effort to define narrative research as a paradigm in its own right, Gabriela Spector-Mersel notes that “according to current perceptions narratives do not *mirror* [a pre-existing entity] but *construct* it” and “through the stories common to the groups we belong to we create our familial, organizational, community and national identities.”[[41]](#endnote-41) The parallels are clear between this view of narrative and contemporary understandings of memory as constructed in the present, within a particular social, cultural and political context, and as a determinant of identity in mnemonic communities. Much research on memory shares with narrative enquiry the view that “social reality is primarily a narrative reality” and both types of investigation have as their focus the stories told at a personal, collective and cultural level.[[42]](#endnote-42)

Indeed, the approach in narrative enquiry described by Corinne Squire, Molly Andrews and Maria Tamboukou as “poststructuralist,” “postmodern” or “deconstructionist”—an approach that will also be taken in this article—promotes exploration of the dynamic interaction between different narrative levels, as it is “preoccupied with the social formations shaping language and subjectivity.”[[43]](#endnote-43) We are, in this view, only the “‘co-authors’” of the stories we tell: our freedom to talk about personal experience is shaped and constrained by the dominant narratives within a given culture.[[44]](#endnote-44) The commonalities are evident between this view of narrative and work on social memory, which highlights the structuring effect of pre-existing narrative schemata and accepted ways of talking about the past.[[45]](#endnote-45)

Thus, as Paul Atkinson and Sara Delamont point out, narratives—and by extension memories—cannot be read as providing “privileged means of access to informants’ personal experiences, or their sources of self-identity,” or to “an interior authentic self.” Narratives should rather be “examined analytically as a performative act” and as “inescapably social phenomena.”[[46]](#endnote-46) Deconstructing accounts of personal experience can thus reveal the interweaving of individual memories with shifting narratives about the past in the social and political spheres, and thereby show “how different stories connect with other stories, discourses and practices in shaping meanings and perceptions.”[[47]](#endnote-47) This, in turn, can respond to the call to see memory in terms of “process-relationalism,” acknowledging the complex entanglement of collective, social and individual accounts of the past. I will therefore approach the eyewitness interviews through a narrative lens, aiming to identify temporal accounts of remembering state socialism since 1989. I will then consider how these accounts are interwoven with understandings of transitional justice, the victims’ involvement with the memorial museum (as guide, interviewee and visitor), and broader collective narratives relating to the history of the GDR and its representation.

## Starting with silence and forgetting

In their narratives of how they came to be involved with the memorialization project at Hohenschönhausen, the starting point of many victims is silence, that is, they recount a previous unwillingness to talk about their past even to their closest family members. Tom, imprisoned for attempting to leave the GDR in 1982 and now a guide at the memorial, states that he did not speak of his incarceration for sixteen years after his release.[[48]](#endnote-48) Franz, detained in Hohenschönhausen in 1975, describes his response as “pushing [what happened to him] to one side for 34 years.”[[49]](#endnote-49) Peter, a former Stasi officer incarcerated in Hohenschönhausen in 1976, asserts that his experiences were “taboo topics” about which he did not speak even to his mother and wife.[[50]](#endnote-50) Wilhelm, held in the work camp attached to the remand prison in 1962, recounts that he wanted to forget his time in the GDR and that as soon as he reached West Germany he thought: “‘Never again GDR, you never want to hear of it again, cut it out, start afresh’.”[[51]](#endnote-51) Wilhelm politicizes this silence, noting that he also kept quiet in order not to endanger his and his wife’s opportunities to visit her parents who remained citizens of the East German state.

These victims thus suggest that they felt no compulsion to talk about their experiences in GDR prisons, even to those closest to them. They thereby indicate a break in communicative or social memory about this part of the East German past: that is, they narrate a failure to pass on their memories of incarceration and the abuse of their human rights to their immediate community and family, at least before the transition of 1989.[[52]](#endnote-52) This gap in transmission is perhaps not unusual in relation to traumatic pasts—the image of the psychiatrist bringing the reluctant individual to discuss deeply buried and painful personal histories is a familiar one. However, the question remains of how this shift from apparent silence to participation in public remembering is accounted for within the narratives of these former detainees. In the context of analyzing the dynamic relationship between different forms of remembering, it is also of special interest to ask what role these individuals consider the changed social context and, in particular, the opening of the memorial to have played in encouraging them to talk about their experiences.

Notably, several of the victims cite recognition of failed inter-generational communication as the first motivation for becoming involved in efforts to commemorate the human rights abuses committed by the Stasi. Martin (whose dates of imprisonment are not given in the transcript) remarks that it was the illness of his daughter that forced him to face his harsh experiences in the GDR. Eight years previously she had begun to suffer from a hardening of the skin caused by scleroderma:

And at that time I came…so I couldn’t see it as mere chance that I’d said about her grandfather [also imprisoned for espionage]: “once a tank driver, always a tank driver.” And my daughter in effect gets a natural armor-plating.… So I said back then …, I can…I have to deal with my issue, so that I don’t also—because I don’t work through it—I pass it on.[[53]](#endnote-53)

Klaus, who was arrested and imprisoned with his parents in 1986, recalls silence and suppression of personal memory alongside commemoration within the family of significant dates, such as their arrest and emigration to the West. He juxtaposes a desire (but inability) to forget—“I cannot erase it at all, even if I would like or want to”—with the statement that he finds the work of the memorial in transmitting the memory of Stasi oppression extremely important, “because it is simply a little piece of GDR history.”[[54]](#endnote-54)

Similarly, Emma, arrested with her husband and imprisoned in Hohenschönhausen in 1972, recalls that she began the process of working through her memories because her son was ill, “and the doctor also said that it was important for him in dealing with the past, that it was not only he that suffered, that is, that he was alone, lonely in the children’s home, but that his parents did too.”[[55]](#endnote-55) Tom narrates that it was the questions of his ten-year-old son in 1998 that provoked his desire to address the past.[[56]](#endnote-56) Thus the statements of these eyewitnesses indicate that it is a perceived need to pass on their memories, at a personal or public level, which turns these individuals into (albeit reluctant) witnesses. This narrative of a transition from silence to communicative and even public remembering points towards a linear movement from recognizing the need to remember for the sake of the next generation to involvement in the work of the memorial as guide, visitor or interviewee. The possibility of transmitting memory to the next generation on a wider scale can also be viewed as one of the contributions memorials make to processes of restoring social recognition to victims: as Mégret notes “[monuments] give a meaning to the suffering of victims and transform it into a positive contribution to society rather than simply try to compensate for it.”[[57]](#endnote-57)

## The importance of being there

Nonetheless, closer examination of the eyewitness accounts suggests that memorialization in fact plays a more complex role in the interaction between individual and intergenerational memory in this regard. In particular, it is the materiality of the prison memorial that is ascribed special significance in the process of reconstructing or completing memories of individual experiences. In her analysis of the guided tours at Hohenschönhausen, Mirjam Dorgelo notes that although guides may describe the tours as functioning “to keep the past at a bearable distance, they simultaneously generate emotional difficulty, or even suffering, and unsolicited recall.”[[58]](#endnote-58) A similar conflict is seen in the narratives of the eyewitnesses contained in the collection of interviews under analysis here. Auratic spaces—that is places directly connected to memories of repression—are presented as especially significant in the process of recall, and the decision to address this part of the past more actively. In particular, returning to the site of their incarceration appears to allow the former detainees to piece together aspects of what happened to them that they were unable to understand or be certain of at the time.

A good example of this interaction between individual memory and the public memorial is seen in Peter’s narrative. Peter was held for a period of time in the so-called “rubber cell”—a dark room, lined with rubber and used to subdue prisoners. He states that after being shut in the unlit cell and leaning against one of the walls, he noticed that they were not concrete: “I then suspected it—I’ve never read crime novels or the like. I thought, that must be rubber, no? I found out for certain later, to be precise on December 18 of the year 2007, by hand, that it was in fact rubber. So I was in the rubber cell.”[[59]](#endnote-59) Similarly, Franz notes that he did not know where he had been interned until he later visited Hohenschönhausen and recognized his former place of incarceration. He narrates that his decision to function as a guide was a form of “working through the past”—a past that he had suppressed for thirty-four years—and that it was something that initially represented a source of fear. He describes how his difficulties at the start of his work at the memorial—particularly dealing with the unwelcome memories it provoked—have since been overcome. He notes a sense of empowerment:

In the tour, I sit on the interrogator’s seat and I now occupy the interrogator’s seat. I have beaten him, I can look the people watching me—the people who also sit in the interrogator’s seat—squarely in the eye, which the other guy [i.e., the former Stasi officer] cannot do in my opinion—he tries to do that often enough, but he cannot in my opinion.[[60]](#endnote-60)

Notable here is not only the story of a personal coming to terms with the past and engagement with social and public remembering but also the sense of having regained a sense of dignity and a moral advantage over his former oppressors. Viebach notes a similar response on the part of survivors of the genocide in Rwanda to memorials commemorating the victims. Her interviewees suggest that the memorials are a form of symbolic punishment for the perpetrators, who, when confronted with the site of conscience, must recognize their wrongdoing.[[61]](#endnote-61)

Martin’s narrative is also particularly interesting in this context. His physical response to leading the tours in Hohenschönhausen is described in a similar way to the physical response of his daughter to the repression of memory in the form of her “natural armor-plating.” He recalls that after approximately a year of working in the memorial he noticed that when describing the Stasi’s methods to visitors, he always unconsciously stood in the exact spot where he had been forced to stand when being verbally abused by the prison guards. He adds that when he compelled himself to go just one step further, he noticed that without thinking he placed his hands behind his neck, as he had been made to do in the prison in which he had served his sentence: “so, that means, you go one meter further and a quite different form of conditioning takes place.” Martin goes on to explain how this realization helped him to recognize the impact the Stasi’s methods had had and to regain his sense of self: “so I was, so to speak, completely alienated from myself by it [the experience] and I through it [the realization] got that back again. So now I’m myself again.”[[62]](#endnote-62) The Hohenschönhausen memorial is thus attributed the ability to promote, or even force a personal confrontation with the past.

## Remembering for and in the new society

We can thus see a common narrative pattern: silence is followed by recognition of the need for intergenerational remembering. The memorial plays a role in both provoking and completing individual memories, which are then transmitted through social or public remembering. But how does the individual process of remembering interact with other available narratives about the GDR past? What is the role of the memorial in this context? In several instances, the individual accounts are explicitly intertwined with the memories of other detainees. Stefan, imprisoned in Hohenschönhausen in 1977–78, for example, expresses his annoyance at the common assertion that prisoners did not know where they were being held: “I have, by the way, met many people, who came out of Hohenschönhausen and knew exactly that they had been in Hohenschönhausen.” He goes on to list individuals who contradict the narrative of others that they had been kept in ignorance about their location.[[63]](#endnote-63) Similarly, Peter recalls that the head of the memorial, Hubertus Knabe, asked him if he had been given an injection when he was in the “rubber cell”: “No. I didn’t get an injection when I was in the rubber cell, because some people also—I’ve read it myself—cracked up, as they say. I didn’t crack up….”[[64]](#endnote-64) In his description of a meeting long after the end of the GDR with the man who had led the investigation against him, Martin notes that many victims “who have a different approach” thought that he had gone mad to want to speak with an ex-Stasi officer.[[65]](#endnote-65) Thus, although Stefan, Peter and Martin contradict alternative narratives about prisoner experience, their engagement with them shapes the stories they tell and indicates that former detainees do indeed represent a “community of memory”—understood in what Iwona Irwin-Zarecka describes as its “most direct meaning” as “a sense of bonding with others solely because of a shared experience.”[[66]](#endnote-66) The eyewitnesses build their memories in a process of “team work,” and the interweaving of personally experienced pasts in this way creates a network that can, in turn, foster a sense of community.[[67]](#endnote-67)

In the interviews, a number of the eyewitnesses confirm the significance of such communities in their efforts to come to terms with the past. Martin notes the importance for him and other affected individuals of being provided with space to discuss the “deformations that they suffered through imprisonment” and to recognize that others have the same experiences.[[68]](#endnote-68) Klaus describes a similar community of individuals who served their sentences in the notorious Bautzen prison; he notes that many of them share his “lack of understanding” and “anger” for the failures of transitional justice, suggesting the creation of common narratives.[[69]](#endnote-69) Emma discusses the importance to her of recording and publishing her memories in the context of a creative writing group and an anthology of testimony about prison life.[[70]](#endnote-70) Although such communities can and do exist outside of the memorial, for example, in the form of victim support groups,[[71]](#endnote-71) the promotion of mnemonic communities through the engagement of victims in the work of public history is one of the key contributions that memorial museums such as Hohenschönhausen can make to processes of transitional justice, as they offer a reaffirmation “of collective belonging and an identity rooted in a tragic and traumatic history.”[[72]](#endnote-72)

Moreover, the concept of community can be taken a step further and linked with social acknowledgement and recognition. Through the recording and wider dissemination of the testimonies of former detainees in diverse forms (be it anthologies, short films, exhibitions or guided tours), the memorial also creates what I term “mediated remembering communities”—that is, groups of individuals who appear to remember together and whose memories overlap and complement each other, but whose community is constructed only within the medium.[[73]](#endnote-73) The individuals within the mediated remembering community may never have met in person and may have no knowledge of the stories of the other detainees; however, the grouping together in different media of their complementary accounts of similar historical experience lends authenticity and thereby authority to the individual narratives. The witness voices do not stand alone but are supported by the accounts mediated alongside them.

Moreover, the “remediation” of eyewitness testimony through the memorial in various media forms allows the memories of this mnemonic community to be transmitted to and potentially have an impact on a much broader audience of visitors, readers or viewers.[[74]](#endnote-74) As Erll argues, in order to ensure a greater impact on what and how society remembers, witness accounts must be recorded and fixed in a way that allows wider distribution.[[75]](#endnote-75) This wider distribution also allows the community to be extended to incorporate all those who visit the memorial or view and read the films and anthologies associated with it.[[76]](#endnote-76) In this way, broader reception of the narratives of their mnemonic community indicates to the former political prisoners that their story is being heard. In their quantitative and qualitative analysis of the response of victims to reparation measures, Roman David and Susanne Yuk-Ping Choi note that “the process of truth-telling only exacerbates [the] frustration [with the current political situation] by raising expectations of greater social acknowledgment that are never met, hence inhibiting socio-political redress.” They suggest that a truth commission might allow the narration of past injustices in a setting that offers “the first acknowledgement of [the victims’] suffering.”[[77]](#endnote-77) Through the creation of (mediated) mnemonic communities and the dissemination of victim memories to a wider public—not as individual testimony, but as a recognized (and authorized) collective narrative—a memorial museum such as Hohenschönhausen also offers such opportunities.

## The dynamics of memory

However, it is not just the narratives circulating within the mnemonic community of former detainees that structures the memories conveyed in the interviews and in the tours, documentary films and anthologies associated with the memorial; broader accounts of the history and memory of the GDR at a societal or political level also impact on the eyewitness texts. Peter recognizes that “he is going to make himself unpopular” before asserting that where East German informants acted out of conviction, West Germans did it primarily for financial gain;[[78]](#endnote-78) he thereby acknowledges how his narrative responds to wider discourses relating to the assumed superiority of the capitalist system. Wilhelm narrates that it is contemporary media discussion surrounding the role of the Stasi in West Germany which leads him to recall a Stasi officer’s boast that they could retrieve any file they wanted in Bonn or West Berlin. Wilhelm states that he did not believe it at the time, but now is in no doubt that the officer was speaking the truth. He goes on to lament the failures of transitional justice seen, in his view, in the continued presence of former Stasi officers and informants in leading positions.[[79]](#endnote-79) A similar complaint—that is, the small percentage of supporters of the system who were ultimately brought to justice—is expressed by Klaus, who also cites his anger regarding these failures as one reason why he cannot put the past behind him. He adds that this is the case for many former detainees.[[80]](#endnote-80) Ralf, imprisoned in Hohenschönhausen in 1985, describes the transition to democracy as a turning point for him in his attitude towards the past and his decision to work through what had happened to him; he states that he saw it as a confirmation of his ideals, “because millions of people went out onto the streets.”[[81]](#endnote-81) Notably, the comments of both Klaus and Ralf indicate the importance of social acknowledgment of the wrongdoing of the perpetrators, and the political convictions of the victims as essential for what David and Choi refer to as “inner healing.”[[82]](#endnote-82)

Significantly, these broader discourses are also seen in the dominant narrative of the memorial as a whole. As we have seen, the representation of the GDR at Gedenkstätte Berlin-Hohenschönhausen is highly politicized and the memorial constructs itself both as a bulwark against nostalgia for the East German state and as the voice of the victims where other forms of transitional justice have failed.[[83]](#endnote-83) As Dorgelo notes, these topics are also commonly addressed during the guided tours.[[84]](#endnote-84) Moreover, as I have shown elsewhere, like the interviewees, the memorial management places a strong emphasis on the importance of intergenerational remembering and the authenticity of the site as an auratic space.[[85]](#endnote-85) Some memories produced in the interviews are even elicited explicitly to fit with the interests of the memorial. The interviewer introduces Peter, for example, as someone who can give information on the use of the “rubber cell”: she notes that “extreme prison conditions, torture, abuse of remand prisoners is a central topic for the memorial.”[[86]](#endnote-86) Similarly, Wilhelm is asked to speak specifically about his time in the work camp attached to the prison, “because it is extremely important for *us* to remember the details” (my emphasis).[[87]](#endnote-87) Thus the memories of the eyewitnesses feed into the work of the memorial, but at the same time they are structured by the aspects of the past considered of interest at the site. Moreover, their accounts of remembering imprisonment appear to refract the memorial’s core narrative about the GDR and its representation.

## Memorials as the locus of contestation

Each individual narrative is unique; however, as the above analysis has shown we can identify some key commonalities across the texts, which allow us to draw broader conclusions about the relationship between memorialization and individual and collective remembering, as well as the significance of sites of memory for the victims of human rights abuses. A common narrative pattern seen within the interview material tells the story of failed communication, followed by recognition that the story must be told for future generations and political education. The place of the memorial in this process is ambiguous in temporal terms: the first visit is seen as both part of the process of dealing with the past and as the starting point for remembering. The memorial draws on the narratives of the individual witnesses in its representation of the past, yet the dominant version of the GDR and its representation in the present, as seen in the public work of the memorial, also appears to be refracted by and in the individual accounts. In this way, the memories of the eyewitnesses feed into political education through the work of the memorial, but they are also shaped by the particular agenda of the site. It is difficult, if not impossible, to determine which narrative preceded the other.

Moreover, the impact of memorialization does not just take place at an individual level. The memorial also functions to create a mnemonic community of individuals with similar experiences. The existence of this community is seen in the interaction of individual narratives with group ones, be it through affirmation or contestation. The offering of space for the creation of remembering communities is an important function of the memorial in terms of transitional justice. This can take the form of individuals physically remembering together within the memorial space (for example, within the community of guides), or it can be constructed in mediated remembering communities, allowing wider distribution of narratives and an outwards extension of the remembering community. Indeed, if we understand heritage as media, the two terms are not so easily separated.[[88]](#endnote-88)

In this respect, the memorial is founded on the community of eyewitnesses for whom (and, in some cases, by whom) it was erected. Their testimonies provide both the legitimation for and much of the substance of the public-facing work of the memorial, as well as contributing through the oral history interviews to its behind-the-scenes research. However, the memorial shapes the narratives of the witnesses in diverse ways—through the creation of (mediated) remembering communities and auratic space, but also through giving new value to particular aspects of the past considered of (political) significance. Indeed, the very existence of the memorial and the eyewitness office makes clear that these are stories considered worth telling, and it is revealing that several victims cite a visit to Hohenschönhausen as one aspect of their decision to talk about their experiences. Again this is an important part of what memorials can contribute to transitional justice processes, in terms of generating a sense of empowerment for victims—a transformation seen strikingly in Franz’s account of occupying his interrogator’s chair. In this way, through offering the chance for victim narratives to be heard and valued, memorials can provide a mode of symbolic reparation that allows a form of vengeance—that is, a symbolic retribution—that does not preclude forgiveness, but also assures against forgetting. This indicates that the aims of vengeance and forgiveness need not be mutually exclusive and that memorial sites can make a contribution to transitional justice that is between the poles of amnesty and punitive justice. This is particularly significant in a context where the former is unthinkable and the latter unsatisfactory or incomplete.

The analysis also demonstrates what an exploration of memorials as a form of transitional justice can bring to memory studies. The interaction between individual and collective remembering at and through the memorial can be understood in terms of the site providing the “narrative tools” which the individual witnesses deploy in their accounts of the past and which cement the group as a remembering community.[[89]](#endnote-89) However, as we have seen, it is impossible to disentangle the individual narratives from those taking place at a broader societal level in terms of dependent and independent variables. The interaction between individual experience, social remembering, memorialization and political education is not a linear one, but is interactive and dynamic. As Olick argues, and as is borne out in this case study, “mnemonic practices—though occurring in an infinity of contexts and through a shifting multiplicity of media—are always simultaneously individual and social.”[[90]](#endnote-90) In this way, the memorial museum can be viewed as a microcosm of the processes of remembering that take place at a wider societal level. The memorial does not produce only cultural memory, *or* political memory, *or* social memory, nor does it act solely as a site for the production and recording of individual testimony; rather it functions as a locus of contestation and collaboration between different narratives about the past.

## Notes

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3. Bruce, “East Germany,” 30; McAdams, *Judging the Past*, 4; Müller, “East Germany,” 248–49; Rosenberg, *The Haunted Lands*, 320. [↑](#endnote-ref-3)
4. Cooke, *Representing East Germany,* 29; McAdams, *Judging the Past*, 4. [↑](#endnote-ref-4)
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7. For more detailed description and analysis of the trials against former elites and those who committed human rights abuses in the GDR, see Bruce, “East Germany,” 25–27; McAdams, “Communism on Trial” and *Judging the Past,* 23–54; Müller, “East Germany,” 257–62; Rosenberg, *The Haunted Lands*, 306–55; Jennifer A. Yoder, “Truth without Reconciliation: An Appraisal of the Enquete Commission on the SED Dictatorship in Germany,” *German Politics* 8, no. 3 (1999): 65–70. [↑](#endnote-ref-7)
8. Frederic Mégret, “Of Shrines, Memorials and Museums: Using the International Criminal Court’s Victim Reparation and Assistance Regime to Promote Transitional Justice,” *Buffalo Human Rights Law Review* 16 (2010): 6. [↑](#endnote-ref-8)
9. Judy Barsalou and Victoria Baxter, *The Urge to Remember: The Role of Memorials in Social Reconstruction and Transitional Justice*, Stabilization and Reconstruction Series, no. 5 (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2007); available at http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/srs5.pdf (accessed September 27, 2013); Elizabeth Jelin, “Public Memorialization in Perspective: Truth, Justice and Memory of Past Repression in the Southern Cone of South America,” *International Journal of Transitional Justice* 1, no. 1 (2007): 138–56. [↑](#endnote-ref-9)
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14. Julia Viebach, “*Alétheia* and the Making of the World: Inner and Outer Dimensions of Memorials in Rwanda,” in Buckley-Zistel and Schäfer, eds., *Memorials in Times of Transition*, 64. [↑](#endnote-ref-14)
15. Martha Minow, *Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History after Genocide and Mass Violence* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1998), 10, 12. [↑](#endnote-ref-15)
16. Ibid., 13, 14, 20, 17, 21. [↑](#endnote-ref-16)
17. Alexandra Barahona de Brito, “Transitional Justice and Memory: Exploring Perspectives,” *South European Society and Politics* 15, no. 3 (2010): 359–76. There have, however, been some other notable efforts towards bringing the two fields together. See, for example, Nicole L. Immler, Ann Rigney and Damien Short, eds., *Reconciliation and Memory: Critical Perspectives*, special issue of *Memory Studies* 5, no. 3 (2012); Elizabeth Jelin, *State Repression and the Labors of Memory* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003); Jelin, “Public Memorialization in Perspective”; and, most recently, Buckley-Zistel and Schäfer, eds., *Memorials in Times of Transition*. [↑](#endnote-ref-17)
18. Barahona de Brito, “Transitional Justice and Memory,” 362, 360. [↑](#endnote-ref-18)
19. Maurice Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory,* ed. and trans. Lewis A. Coser (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992). See also Harald Welzer, *Das kommunikative Gedächtnis: Eine Theorie der Erinnerung* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2002), and “Re-Narrations: How Pasts Change in Conversational Remembering,” *Memory Studies* 3, no. 1 (Jan. 2010): 5–17. [↑](#endnote-ref-19)
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28. Stiftung Gedenkstätte Berlin-Hohenschönhausen, *5. Tätigkeitsbericht* (2009–2010), 20. [↑](#endnote-ref-28)
29. See Sara Jones, *The Media of Testimony: Remembering the East German Stasi in the Berlin Republic* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2014), 128–36. [↑](#endnote-ref-29)
30. Stiftung Gedenkstätte Berlin-Hohenschönhausen, *1. Tätigkeitsbericht*, 10. [↑](#endnote-ref-30)
31. See Jones, *The Media of Testimony*, chap. 5. [↑](#endnote-ref-31)
32. See, for example, Jonathan Bach, “‘The Taste Remains’: Consumption, (N)ostalgia, and the Production of East Germany,” *Public Culture* 14, no. 3 (2002): 545–56; Paul Cooke, “Surfing for Eastern Difference: Ostalgie, Identity and Cyberspace?” *Seminar* 40, no. 3 (2004): 207–20; Claire Hyland, “‘*Ostalgie* Doesn’t Fit!’: Individual Interpretations of and Interaction with *Ostalgie*,” in Anna Saunders and Debbie Pinfold, eds., *Remembering and Rethinking the GDR: Multiple Perspectives and Plural Authenticities* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 101–15; Irmgard Zündorf, “Vitrine oder Wühltisch? DDR-Alltagsgeschichte im Museum,” in Katrin Hammerstein and Jan Scheunemann, eds., *Die Musealisierung der DDR: Wege, Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der Darstellung von Zeitgeschichte in stadt- und regionalgeschichtlichen Museen* (Berlin: Metropol, 2012), 96–109. [↑](#endnote-ref-32)
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42. Ibid., 211, 213. [↑](#endnote-ref-42)
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49. Eyewitness Interview, March, 16 2009. (Unless otherwise stated, all translations from German are my own.) [↑](#endnote-ref-49)
50. Eyewitness Interview, May, 14 2008. [↑](#endnote-ref-50)
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59. Eyewitness Interview, May, 14 2008. [↑](#endnote-ref-59)
60. Eyewitness Interview, March, 16 2009. [↑](#endnote-ref-60)
61. Viebach, “*Alétheia* and the Making of the World,” 89. Similar sentiments are expressed by Holocaust survivors on return visits to Auschwitz. See Tim Cole, “Crematoria, Barracks, Gateway: Survivors' Return Visits to the Memory Landscapes of Auschwitz,” *History & Memory* 25, no. 2 (2013): 119-20. [↑](#endnote-ref-61)
62. Eyewitness Interview, June, 10 2008. [↑](#endnote-ref-62)
63. Eyewitness Interview, December, 4 2007. [↑](#endnote-ref-63)
64. Eyewitness Interview, May, 14 2008. [↑](#endnote-ref-64)
65. Eyewitness Interview, June, 10 2008. [↑](#endnote-ref-65)
66. Iwona Irwin-Zarecka, *Frames of Remembrance: The Dynamics of Collective Memory* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1994), 47. [↑](#endnote-ref-66)
67. Assmann, *Der lange Schatten*, 28 24. [↑](#endnote-ref-67)
68. Eyewitness Interview, June, 10 2008. [↑](#endnote-ref-68)
69. Eyewitness Interview, June, 11 2009. [↑](#endnote-ref-69)
70. Eyewitness Interview, May, 26 2009. [↑](#endnote-ref-70)
71. See, for example, Anselma Gallinat, “Difficult Stories: Public Discourse and Narrative Identity in Eastern Germany,” *Ethnos* 71, no. 3 (2006): 343–66. [↑](#endnote-ref-71)
72. Jelin, “Public Memorialization in Perspective,” 147. Buckley-Zistel notes in reference to Hohenschönhausen that the exchange of experience between the former detainees creates a collective memory, which leads “to a sense of cohesion, the construction of a collective identity and to an adjustment of memory patterns.” Susanne Buckley-Zistel, “Detained in the Memorial Hohenschönhausen: Heterotopias, Narratives and Transitions from the Stasi Past in Germany,” in Buckley-Zistel and Schäfer, eds., *Memorials in Times of Transition*, 111. [↑](#endnote-ref-72)
73. See Jones, *The Media of Testimony*. [↑](#endnote-ref-73)
74. Jay David Bolter and Richard Grusin, *Remediation: Understanding New Media* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999). [↑](#endnote-ref-74)
75. Astrid Erll, *Memory in Culture,* trans. Sara B. Young (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 114. [↑](#endnote-ref-75)
76. See Jones, *The Media of Testimony*, 187–95. [↑](#endnote-ref-76)
77. Roman David and Susanne Yuk-Ping Choi “Victims on Transitional Justice: Lessons from the Reparation of Human Rights Abuses in the Czech Republic,” *Human Rights Quarterly* 27, no. 2 (2005): 427, 432. [↑](#endnote-ref-77)
78. Eyewitness Interview, May, 14 2008. [↑](#endnote-ref-78)
79. Eyewitness Interview, June, 4 2009. [↑](#endnote-ref-79)
80. Eyewitness Interview, June, 11 2009. [↑](#endnote-ref-80)
81. Eyewitness Interview, June, 16 2009. [↑](#endnote-ref-81)
82. David and Choi, “Victims on Transitional Justice,” 410. [↑](#endnote-ref-82)
83. See also Sara Jones, “Community and Genre: Autobiographical Rememberings of Stasi Oppression,” in Saunders and Pinfold, eds. *Remembering and Rethinking the GDR,* 67–82. [↑](#endnote-ref-83)
84. Dorgelo, “(Un)Locked Lives,” 55–57. [↑](#endnote-ref-84)
85. Jones, “At Home with the Stasi.” [↑](#endnote-ref-85)
86. Eyewitness Interview, May, 14 2008. [↑](#endnote-ref-86)
87. Eyewitness Interview, June, 4 2009. [↑](#endnote-ref-87)
88. Roger Silverstone, “Heritage as Media: Some Implications for Research,” in David L. Uzzell, ed., *Heritage Interpretation,* vol. 2, *The Visitor Experience* (London: Belhaven, 1989), 138–48. [↑](#endnote-ref-88)
89. Wertsch and Roediger, “Collective Memory,” 324. [↑](#endnote-ref-89)
90. Jeffrey K. Olick, “From Collective Memory to the Sociology of Mnemonic Practices and Products,” in Erll and Nünning, eds., *Cultural Memory Studies,* 158. See also Jeffrey K. Olick, “Collective Memory: The Two Cultures,” *Sociological Theory* 17, no. 3 (1999): 346. [↑](#endnote-ref-90)