Abstract
We find a negative relation between democracy and initial public offering (IPO) underpricing for a sample of 23,050 IPOs across 45 countries. The effect of democracy on underpricing is weaker for IPOs audited by Big 4 auditing firms, backed by venture capital firms, and with better disclosure specificity of use of proceeds. Democracy exerts a larger influence on underpricing for firms with higher agency problems, in countries with weaker institutional quality or shareholder protection, and during periods of high investor sentiment or economic policy uncertainty. Overall, our results highlight the importance of democracy in reducing IPO underpricing around the world.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 322-341 |
Number of pages | 20 |
Journal | Journal of Financial Economics |
Volume | 145 |
Issue number | 1 |
Early online date | 23 Jul 2021 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Jul 2022 |
Bibliographical note
Funding Information:We are grateful to an anonymous referee for the insightful comments and suggestions, which have significantly improved the paper. Veeraraghavan thanks the T A Pai Chair Professorship for funding support. We thank Savitha Heggede and Meghana Mohan for excellent research assistance. All errors are our own.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2021
Keywords
- Corporate governance
- Democracy
- Information asymmetry
- IPO underpricing
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Accounting
- Finance
- Economics and Econometrics
- Strategy and Management