TY - JOUR
T1 - Achieving groundwater governance
T2 - Ostrom’s design principles and payments for ecosystem services approaches
AU - Nsoh, Walters
PY - 2022/5/17
Y1 - 2022/5/17
N2 - Groundwater is a largely unseen common pool resource. Yet driven by strong economic incentives, whether or not encouraged by existing policies, groundwater users typically think of it as a ‘private good’ that benefits them as any other good or service might, and in so doing, they are competing with each other to extract as much as possible with devastating consequences for its sustainability. The challenges faced for sustainably managing such common pool resources, on which people have established de facto individual rights, are manifold. But creating a market for trades of some kind in ecosystem services associated with groundwater could actually enhance the protection of this critical resource on the basis that protection can benefit individual groundwater users economically as well as provide a broader public good. This article uses Elinor Ostrom’s design principles as an analytical tool to examine how market-based approaches such as Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) fit with some of the governance models that could be used to protect and enhance groundwater as a common pool resource. It argues that while there are specific design challenges to be overcome, PES as an institutional tool can accord with Ostrom’s ideas for the governance of groundwater.
AB - Groundwater is a largely unseen common pool resource. Yet driven by strong economic incentives, whether or not encouraged by existing policies, groundwater users typically think of it as a ‘private good’ that benefits them as any other good or service might, and in so doing, they are competing with each other to extract as much as possible with devastating consequences for its sustainability. The challenges faced for sustainably managing such common pool resources, on which people have established de facto individual rights, are manifold. But creating a market for trades of some kind in ecosystem services associated with groundwater could actually enhance the protection of this critical resource on the basis that protection can benefit individual groundwater users economically as well as provide a broader public good. This article uses Elinor Ostrom’s design principles as an analytical tool to examine how market-based approaches such as Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) fit with some of the governance models that could be used to protect and enhance groundwater as a common pool resource. It argues that while there are specific design challenges to be overcome, PES as an institutional tool can accord with Ostrom’s ideas for the governance of groundwater.
KW - groundwater
KW - governance
KW - common pool resources
KW - Ostrom’s design principles
KW - payments for ecosystem services
UR - http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJournal?jid=TEL
U2 - 10.1017/S2047102522000164
DO - 10.1017/S2047102522000164
M3 - Article
SN - 2047-1025
VL - 11
SP - 381
EP - 406
JO - Transnational Environmental Law
JF - Transnational Environmental Law
IS - 2
ER -