Abstract
This paper examines attention as a scientific concept, and argues that it has a patchwork structure. On this view, the concept of attention takes on different meanings, depending on the scientific context. I argue that these different meanings vary systematically along four dimensions, as a result of the epistemic goals of the scientific programme in question and the constraints imposed by the scientific context. Based on this, I argue that attention is a general reasoning strategy concept: it provides general, non-specific guidance that aids scientific work. As well as shedding light on attention as a scientific concept, this theory has two wider consequences. First, it demonstrates that the patchwork approach is a fruitful way to think about psychological concepts. Second, it provides novel resources to resist eliminativism about attention.
Original language | English |
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Article number | 36 |
Number of pages | 25 |
Journal | European Journal for Philosophy of Science |
Volume | 13 |
Issue number | 3 |
Early online date | 7 Aug 2023 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Sept 2023 |
Keywords
- Patchwork concepts
- Attention
- Eliminativism
- Psychology