Abstract
It is argued that higher-order awareness is central to one type of everyday rationality. The author starts by specifying the target notion of rationality, contrasting it with other useful notions in the neighbourhood. It is then shown that the target notion relies on first-person awareness of the unfolding of cognition. This is used to explain the kernel of truth in epistemic conservatism, the structure of defeasibility, and the root motive behind the widely accepted distinction between rational inference and trivial entailment.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 78-98 |
Journal | Grazer Philosophische Studien |
Volume | 99 |
Issue number | 1 |
Early online date | 13 May 2022 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 21 Jun 2022 |
Keywords
- defeasibility
- entailment
- higher-order awareness
- inference
- rationality