Abstract
We examine whether board representation of bondholders can be an effective market discipline mechanism to reduce bank risk, using a unique dataset combining information on bondholders and boards of directors of European listed banks. Our results show that the influence of bondholder representatives on the bank board significantly reduces bank risk without impacting profitability. The beneficial effect of this market discipline mechanism is stronger when bondholder representatives have regulatory experience, current or long relationships with their affiliated bondholders, and for more complex banks. In contrast, the reducing impact on bank risk is smaller for banks with lower capitalization levels.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 738-765 |
Journal | Economic Inquiry |
Volume | 61 |
Issue number | 3 |
Early online date | 10 Feb 2023 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Jul 2023 |
Keywords
- market discipline
- bank risk
- board of directors
- bondholder representatives