Taking Embodiment Seriously in Ethics and Political Philosophy

It is a common refrain in a certain brand of critical theorising that both liberal political philosophy and ethical theory pay insufficient attention to the fact that people are embodied. Care ethicists, for example, argue that liberalism’s abstract conception of the self prioritises independence and autonomy, obscuring our inevitable and universal vulnerability as embodied beings. Similar charges are often levelled against mainstream deontological and consequentialist ethical theories. Due to their commitment to the use of abstract principles in moral reasoning, these views are purportedly forced to ignore the importance of contextual facts (including facts about people’s embodiment) in determining what is right and/or good.

In this paper I argue two things. First, that far from presupposing a disembodied view of the self, ethical and political theories that make use of the notions of harm, autonomy, and fairness cannot (and ought not to) justifiably be cashed out without taking account of people’s embodied nature. Second, the paper argues that taking people’s embodiment seriously is compatible with the use of principles in ethics and political philosophy. Although poorly formulated principles may lead to erroneous decision, as recent work in the ethics of care shows, there is nothing barring us from incorporating contextual facts (including facts about how people are embodied) into the formulation and application of our principles.