Abstract
How do we understand other individuals’ actions? Answers to this question cluster around two extremes: either by ascribing to the observed individual mental states such as intentions, or without ascribing any mental states. Thus, action understanding is either full-blown mindreading, or not mindreading. An intermediate option is lacking, but would be desirable for interpreting some experimental findings. I provide this intermediate option: actions may be understood by ascribing to the observed individual proto-intentions. Unlike intentions, proto-intentions are subject to context-bound normative constraints, therefore being more widely available across development. Action understanding, when it consists in proto-intention ascription, can be a minimal form of mindreading.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 371-387 |
Number of pages | 17 |
Journal | Croatian Journal of Philosophy |
Volume | 22 |
Issue number | 66 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 27 Dec 2022 |
Keywords
- Action understanding
- mindreading
- Minimal Theory of Mind
- intentions
- normativity