The price of mathematical scepticism

Paul Levy*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

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Abstract

This paper argues that, insofar as we doubt the bivalence of the Continuum Hypothesis or the truth of the Axiom of Choice, we should also doubt the consistency of third-order arithmetic, both the classical and intuitionistic versions.

Underlying this argument is the following philosophical view. Mathematical belief springs from certain intuitions, each of which can be either accepted or doubted in its entirety, but not half-accepted. Therefore, our beliefs about reality, bivalence, choice and consistency should all be aligned.
Original languageEnglish
Article numbernkac011
Pages (from-to)283-305
Number of pages23
JournalPhilosophia Mathematica
Volume30
Issue number3
Early online date30 Jun 2022
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Oct 2022

Bibliographical note

The article was published in advance in June 2022. The issue appeared in October 2022.

Keywords

  • Scepticism
  • Axiom of Choice
  • Continuum Hypothesis
  • Consistency
  • Quantification
  • Bivalence

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Logic
  • Philosophy

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