Abstract
I distinguish between two broadly different interpretations of anomalous monism. I then pose problems for both. I argue that one interpretation leads to well known problems concerning epiphenomenalism, whilst the other interpretation is implausible because it fails to give a good account of the role of properties in causation. I then develop a new version of anomalous monism, which can avoid both of these issues. This view draws heavily on the metaphysics of dispositions, as well as work on causation. I conclude that anomalous monism is deserving of a reappraisal.
Original language | English |
---|---|
Title of host publication | Consciousness and the Ontology of Properties |
Editors | Mihretu Guta |
Place of Publication | New York |
Publisher | Routledge |
Chapter | 3 |
Pages | 39-52 |
Number of pages | 14 |
Edition | 1st |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9781351598903, 9781315104706 |
ISBN (Print) | 9781138097865 |
Publication status | Published - 19 Jul 2018 |