A powerful new Anomalous Monism

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Abstract

I distinguish between two broadly different interpretations of anomalous monism. I then pose problems for both. I argue that one interpretation leads to well known problems concerning epiphenomenalism, whilst the other interpretation is implausible because it fails to give a good account of the role of properties in causation. I then develop a new version of anomalous monism, which can avoid both of these issues. This view draws heavily on the metaphysics of dispositions, as well as work on causation. I conclude that anomalous monism is deserving of a reappraisal.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationConsciousness and the Ontology of Properties
EditorsMihretu Guta
Place of PublicationNew York
PublisherRoutledge
Chapter3
Pages39-52
Number of pages14
Edition1st
ISBN (Electronic)9781351598903, 9781315104706
ISBN (Print)9781138097865
Publication statusPublished - 19 Jul 2018

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