Abstract
This volume brings together recent work on belief and its connection to truth with issues concerning belief that arise in the philosophy of art. In the twelve new essays collected here, contributors address questions at the intersection of philosophy of mind and philosophy of art, while also advancing these debates.
Some of the chapters herein discuss the cognitive contributions artworks can make, for example, whether authors of fiction can testify to their readers. If they can, are they culpable for the false beliefs of their readers formed in response to their work? If they cannot, that is, if the testimonial powers of authors of fiction are limited, is there some non-testimonial epistemic role that fiction can play? And in any case, is such a role relevant when determining the value of the work?
Also taken up in the volume are issues concerned with the phenomenon of fictional persuasion, specifically, what is the nature of the attitude involved in such cases (those in which we form beliefs about the real world in response to reading fiction)? If these attitudes are typically unstable, unjustified, and unreliable, does this put pressure on the view that they are beliefs? If these attitudes are beliefs, does this put pressure on the view that all beliefs are aimed at truth?
The final pair of papers in the volume take different stances on the nature of aesthetic testimony, in particular, is testimony of this kind a legitimate source of beliefs about aesthetic properties and value?
Some of the chapters herein discuss the cognitive contributions artworks can make, for example, whether authors of fiction can testify to their readers. If they can, are they culpable for the false beliefs of their readers formed in response to their work? If they cannot, that is, if the testimonial powers of authors of fiction are limited, is there some non-testimonial epistemic role that fiction can play? And in any case, is such a role relevant when determining the value of the work?
Also taken up in the volume are issues concerned with the phenomenon of fictional persuasion, specifically, what is the nature of the attitude involved in such cases (those in which we form beliefs about the real world in response to reading fiction)? If these attitudes are typically unstable, unjustified, and unreliable, does this put pressure on the view that they are beliefs? If these attitudes are beliefs, does this put pressure on the view that all beliefs are aimed at truth?
The final pair of papers in the volume take different stances on the nature of aesthetic testimony, in particular, is testimony of this kind a legitimate source of beliefs about aesthetic properties and value?
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Publisher | Oxford University Press |
| Publication status | Published - Nov 2017 |
Keywords
- Art
- Belief
- Testimony
- Literature
- Transportation
- Knowledge
- Imagination