Abstract
We investigate norms of corruption using the norm-elicitation procedure introduced by Krupka and Weber (2013). We use a within-subject design whereby the norms are elicited from the same subjects who are observed making choices in a bribery game. We test whether the order in which the norm-elicitation task and the bribery game are conducted affects elicited norms and behavior. We find little evidence of order effects in our experiment. We discuss how these results compare with those reported in the existing literature.
Original language | English |
---|---|
Pages (from-to) | 1-7 |
Journal | Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics |
Volume | 62 |
Early online date | 7 Mar 2016 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Jun 2016 |
Keywords
- Social norms
- Norm elicitation
- Order effects
- Within-subject design
- Bribery game