Abstract
One of the most important metaethical debates concerns the relationship between evaluative judgments and motivation. The so-called judgment internalists claim that there is an internal modal connection between our evaluative judgments and motivation, whereas the so-called externalists believe that evaluative judgments are connected to desires only through contingent external facts. This debate has reached a standoff. My aim is to introduce a completely new argument for internalism, which does not rely on our intuitions about individual cases. I argue that the truth of internalism explains best why the so-called transparency method yields self-knowledge of what we desire.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 489-503 |
Number of pages | 15 |
Journal | Ethical Theory and Moral Practice |
Volume | 21 |
Issue number | 3 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 18 Aug 2018 |
Keywords
- Desire
- Evaluative judgment
- Judgment internalism
- Moral psychology
- Motivation
- Self-knowledge