@article{260bbba1236146b4a78d7f34bd5c5570,
title = "Delegated Legislation in the Pandemic: Further Limits of a Constitutional Bargain Revealed",
abstract = "The challenge that delegated legislation poses to parliamentary sovereignty and associated supremacy in the UK is purportedly addressed through what we term the {\textquoteleft}constitutional bargain of delegated law-making{\textquoteright}. This has three elements: the proper limitation of delegation by Parliament through well-designed parent legislation, the exercise of self-restraint by the Executive in the use of delegated authority, and the enablement of meaningful scrutiny by Parliament. As a paradigm situation in which delegated law-making might be said to be necessary, the first year of the COVID-19 pandemic is an apposite context in which to assess the robustness of that bargain. Our analysis uses a sample of Westminster-generated pandemic-related secondary instruments as a peephole into the broader dynamics of this constitutional bargain and further reveals its significant frailties; frailties that are exposed, but not created, by the pandemic.",
keywords = "constitutional law, delegated legislation, COVID-19 policy making",
author = "Daniella Lock and {de Londras}, Fiona and Pablo Grez",
year = "2023",
month = oct,
day = "5",
doi = "10.1017/lst.2023.25",
language = "English",
journal = "Legal Studies",
issn = "0261-3875",
publisher = "Blackwell-Wiley",
}