Abstract
The corporate governance of banks and financial institutions came under the spotlight in the wake of the global financial crisis 2008–09, the subsequent conduct scandals such as the manipulation of the London Inter-Bank Offered Rate by several UK and international banks, and other miss-selling, corruption and financial crime scandals. In Chapter 1, Andreas Kokkinis discusses the governance structure of most widely held banks and financial institutions, and the incentives that may result in excessive risk-taking. He reveals that conventional agency-based corporate governance frameworks may be unsuitable for banks and financial institutions as they arguably do not address the governance challenges in banks and financial institutions and may indeed entail counter-productive incentives exacerbating governance problems.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | The Law on Corporate Governance in Banks |
Publisher | Edward Elgar, Cheltenham UK |
Chapter | 1 |
Pages | 1-41 |
Number of pages | 41 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Feb 2015 |